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ABSTRACT
The interrelationship between law, courts and politics has always been complex and
multidimensional. The role and political significance of courts are prominent dimensions
of this interrelationship. Over the past decades, there has been global expansion of
judicial power, in parallel with the proliferation of modern constitutionalism principles.
One of the fundamental manifestations of this trend is the judicialization of politics- the
reliance on courts for addressing pivotal social, economic, moral and political
controversies and public policy questions. This phenomenon manifests profound transfer
of power from representative institutions, mainly legislatures and executives, to
judiciaries. Political importance of courts expanded, in scope, to comprise “megapolitics”- the most crucial social, economic predicaments as well as controversies of
utmost political prominence that influence the entire society. This research portrays the
definitions and explanations of the judicialization of mega-politics globally. Then,
analyzes judgments of the Egyptian State Council in the past two decades (2000-2020) to
inspect the occurrence, forms and reasons of this phenomenon. The judicialization of pure
politics is manifested in three forms, when courts: 1) Narrow the doctrine of sovereignty
acts, that are immune of judicial review. 2) Perform explicit judicial law-making 3)
Establish/abolish a major public policy. The phenomenon is attributed to institutional
factors, mainly the constitutional framework that facilitates judicial activism, besides
legal mobilization practiced by activists seeking for social change via strategic litigation.
Furthermore, the main driving force behind the phenomenon is the judges’ professional
perception of their role as guarantor of rights and liberties and a fundamental
constitutional check on the executive authority. This perception is the result of
accumulated progressive judicial practice- what I describe as “progressive judicial
legacy.”
KEY WORDS: State Council, administrative courts, judicialization of politics,
judicialization of mega-politics, pure politics, judicial politics, law and courts, acts of
sovereignty, judicial role perception.
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Introduction
The interrelationship between law, courts and politics has always been complex and
multidimensional. The role and significance of courts as a political actor are prominent
dimensions of this interrelationship. In this regard, the world has witnessed a profound
transfer of power from representative institutions to judiciaries over the last decades.1
Courts all over the world are making significant policy decisions that were previously
perceived as the purview of politicians.2 The judiciary increasingly gains more authority
as an influential institution interacting with other political actors in a society. The range
of activities over which courts exercise considerable authority has immensely expanded
quantitatively and qualitatively. The increasing political significance of courts has
expanded in scope to comprise the most core political, moral, social and economic
controversies.
Theoretically, the Separation of Powers doctrine connotes that judges are competent with
resolving disputes. Their fundamental function is to apply law. On the other hand,
politicians, mainly the elected representative of the people, are responsible for making
law. Accordingly, the process of policy-making is essentially entitled to politicians.
Establishment of public policies is the outcome of political interactions that take place
within the representative institutions of a society. Politicians are supposedly the ones
responsible for providing solutions to social, economic and political quandaries through
democratic means.
Over the past decades, judicial power has expanded all over the world.3 In the context of
separation of powers, while practicing their main function i.e. judicial review, courts
gradually expand their authority and constantly issue rulings pertaining to the most
1

Ran Hirschl, The New Constitutionalism and the Judicialization of Pure Politics Worldwide, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 721 (2006).
2
Tom Ginsburg, The judicialization of administrative governance: Causes, consequences and limits, 2008
at 1
3
Tom Ginsburg, The Global Spread of Constitutional Review, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW
AND POLITICS 81, 82-87

1

pivotal social, economic and political predicaments in many countries. Hence, the process
of policy-making has been deeply integrated with the core function of judges to interpret
and apply the law. This led to the emergence of what may be termed the “judicialization
of politics”. The locus of political activity and making public policies, regarding
fundamental matters in almost all aspects, has been transferred to courtrooms. The
judicialization of politics has expanded its ambit to comprise what is termed “megapolitics”- matters of ultimate political significance in a society. The ever-increasing
judicialization of politics and mega-politics is considered one of the most striking
phenomena in late-20th and early-21st century government.4 It is argued that:
Core political controversies are framed as predominantly constitutional
ones, with the concomitant assumption that courts are the suitable forum
to deal with them. The list of examples seems endless: the fate of the
American presidency or national health care plan; what is the exact
meaning of Israel's self-definition as a Jewish and democratic state; the
legitimacy of the German bailout deal or the status of German sovereignty
in the larger EU; the validity of Russia's war in Chechnya or accession to
the WTO; the dollarization plan in Argentina; disqualification of political
parties in Turkey, Belgium and Spain; the scope of Islamic law as a source
of legislation in Egypt or Malaysia; whether sending Korean troops to Iraq
is allowed; whether violation of term limits by incumbent leaders in
Colombia, Uganda, or Venezuela is constitutional.5

There have been constant endeavors to explore and assess the tendency towards the
judicialization of politics. These attempts mainly focus on the situation in established
democracies like the US and European countries,6 and in nascent democracies.7 What is
usually at stake is the democratic credentials of judicial review. Tremendous
controversies are raised about the expansion of judicial review and whether it is a
4

Ran Hirschil, The Fuzzy Boundaries of (Un)Constitutionality: Two Tales of Political Jurisprudence, 31 U.
Queensland L.J. 319 (2012).
5
Id.
6
See, e.g., Martin Shapiro, Juridicalization of Politics in the United States, 15 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 101
(1994); Cristine Landfried, The Judicialization of Politics in Germany, International Political Science
Review, 1994; Russell A. Miller, Lords of Democracy: The Judicialization of Pure Politics in the United
States and Germany, 61 Wash. & LEE L. REV. 587 (2004); Barry Holmstrom, The Judicialization of
Politics in Sweden. International Political Science Review, 1994.ANDFRIED
7
See, e.g., JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA (Rachel Sieder et al., eds. 2005);
Chien-Chih Lin, The Judicialization of Politics in Taiwan, 3 AsianJLS 299 (2016); CHIEN-CHIH LIN,
THE JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS IN NEW DEMOCRACIES.

2

counter-democratic practice or it can be reconcilable with democracy. The fact that courts
have been promoted and gained more authoritative power than before has precipitated
fierce debates on whether this power increase at the expense of the representative
institutions. On the other hand, unfortunately, the judicialization of politics in
authoritarian regimes rarely receives plausible attention in the academic work and if so,
focus is mainly directed to constitutional courts.8
This work endeavors to analyze cases of the Egyptian State Council’s involvement in
mega-politics i.e. core political, social and economic controversies. The purpose if this
work is of tripartite significance. First, it seeks to enrich the literature on the
judicialization of mega-politics through examination of the phenomenon in Egypt as a
part of the understudied region of the Arab World. In the meanwhile, it fills in a pivotal
gab by studying administrative courts instead of concentrating only on the Supreme
Constitutional Court (hereinafter referred to as the SCC). Second, this work explores the
interrelationship between administrative courts, law and politics to determine whether the
engagement by courts in the policy-making process reflects the occurrence of the
judicialization of mega-politics in a comparable way to the situation in consolidated
democracies. Third, this work attempts to trace the development of the judicialization of
mega-politics not only through examining the final declaration of courts’ rulings, but also
via thorough legal examination of the verdicts substance to point out the mindset of
judges and their legal and judicial means to judicialize pure politics. Such dual
examination provides a more comprehensive and profound understanding of the
proliferation of judicialized mega-politics and help to specify the factors which
fundamentally affects its emergence and progress. Furthermore, this work proposes that
the occurrence of the judicialization of mega-politics in the State Council courtrooms has
been constantly observed all over the past twenty years from 2000 to 2020.
Administrative judges have clearly exhibited robust engagement in matters of utmost
social, economic and political significance.
8

See, e.g., Duncan McCargo, Competing Notions of Judicialization in Thailand, Contemporary Southeast
Asia Vol. 36, 2014; Alexei Trochev, Less Democracy, More Courts: A Puzzle of Judicial Review in Russia,
2004.
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This thesis proceeds in three parts. Part 1 illustrates the definition of the phenomena of
judicialization of politics and mega-politics and their proliferation as global trends and
then move to the situation in Egypt to demonstrate the jurisdiction and functions of the
State Council (administrative judiciary) in Egypt. Part 2 indicates the forms of
judicialization of mega-politics in administrative justice through analysis of some major
judgments that represent the engagement of administrative courts in major social,
economic and political quandaries. Part 3 articulates the factors contributing to the
administrative courts’ judicialization of mega-politics.

4

Chapter I. The phenomenon of the judicialization of mega-politics.
This chapter seeks to illustrate the global tendency towards the judicialization of politics
and mega-politics and depict the common literature’s main theories for explaining this
phenomenon. Besides, it elaborates the emergence of the judicialization of politics in
Egypt in the past two decades especially in the judgments of the Supreme Constitutional
Court (SCC). Then it explores the judicial competence and functions of the State Council
in Egypt as an endeavor to explain why a nondemocratic regime may empower
administrative courts to the extent that they are capable of judicializing mega-politics.
A. The judicialization of politics and mega-politics as global trends.
To “judicialize” is to “treat judicially, make judicial in character, to subject to judicial
process or decision.”9 In this regard, “judicially” refers to “capacity of judge, in relation
to the administration of justice by legal process, by sentence of a court. ”10 Accordingly,
judicialization simply refers to the expansion of treating a wide range of aspects
judicially. On the other hand, undoubtedly there is no universal or legally accepted
definition of “politics. In other words, it has a numerous number of definitions according
to the lens through which it is perceived.11
In the context of this research, I address the term “politics” as the art of government. The
word “politics” originates from the Greek word “polis”, which means city-state.
Therefore, politics mainly relate to what concerns the state; its aims, purposes and
institutions. A narrow definition of politics in this regard is the study of the governmenta collection of officers who make, interpret and enforce rules for the whole community.12

9

Lexico Dictionary, Powered by Oxford, available at https://www.lexico.com/definition/judicialize (last
visited Jan. 14, 2022).
10
Torbjorn Vallinder, The judicialization of politics- A worldwide phenomenon, International Political
Science Review 1994.
11
Eugene F. Miller, What Does "Political" Mean? 42 The Review of Politics. 56 (1980).
12
Valeri Modebadze, The term politics reconsidered in the light of recent theoretical developments, IBSU
Scientific Journal (IBSUSJ), 2010 at 41.
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According to this definition, politics occur only within the government departments,
cabinet rooms and legislative chambers. Hence, only civil servants, politicians and
lobbyists are involved in politics and the vast majority of the people are not engaged. All
the institutions that are not “running the country” are considered as “non-political.”13 At
the top of these institutions is the judiciary.
Judicialization of politics is a multifaceted concept that has not been inclusively defined.
There are two main approaches attempting to define this phenomenon. The first One
depicts the phenomenon by concentrating on the proliferation of judicial decision-making
methods and legal discourse in every aspect of modern life. Accordingly, the
judicialization of politics refers to “the spread of legal discourse, jargon, rules, and
procedures into the political sphere and policy-making forums and processes.”14 It
reflects the situation in which law, litigation, and legal discourse have permeated every
corner of society as a feature of the complexity of modern societies.15 It is manifested by
the subordination of almost all decision-making forums in modern societies, especially
those adhering to the rule of law, to quasi-judicial procedures and rules. It is genuinely
related to law’s expropriation of social conflicts and its control of social relations, and
accordingly is sometimes described as “judicialization of social relations.”16
The other approach of defining the judicialization of politics focuses on the expansion of
the judiciary’s role and the increasing significance of courts as an actor in the political
field compared to other main actors i.e. the legislatures and executives. In this regard, the
judicialization of politics is defined as “the process by which courts and judges come to
make or increasingly dominate the making of public policies that had been previously
made by other governmental agencies, especially legislatures and executives.”17 It
characterizes “the reliance on courts and judicial means for addressing core moral
13

See HeywoodAndrew, Politics, Macmillan Press LTD, London, (1997).
14 Ran Hirschl, Supra note 1, at 723.
15
Rachel Sieder, Introduction to The Judicialization of Politics in Latin America, at 5.
16
Ran Hirchil Supra note 1, at 724-725.
17
TAMIR MOUSTAFA, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: LAW, POLITICS,
DEVELOPMENT IN EGYPT, CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2007 at 26.
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AND ECONOMIC

predicaments, public policy questions, and political controversies.18” Accordingly. the
judicialization of politics represents the expansion of the judiciary’s power at the expense
of the legislatives and executives. Decision-making authority regarding crucial social,
economic, moral or political controversies is transferred to courts from politicians and/or
administrators.19
In my perspective, the second approach provides more proper definition of the tendency
towards the judicialization of politics as it focuses on the expansion of judicial review at
the expense the executives and legislatures, which results in courts determination of the
outcomes of major social, economic and political quandaries and public policy questions.
Amplification of judicial review is the focal point of the phenomenon of the
judicialization of politics. In terms of separation of powers, judicial review is entitled to
courts mainly to preserve this separation. However, judges’ jurisdiction has been largely
expanded. Although judges have to base their decisions on pre-existing constitutional and
statutory texts, their discretion and interpretative authority of these texts are so huge that
they get embroiled in making public policy decisions as well as establishing judge-made
laws. Hence, they are essentially legislating, not adjudicating.20
On the other hand, the first approach of defining the judicialization of politics does not
depict the genuine elements of the phenomenon. Rather, it provides for a contributory
factor of judicialized politics. The proliferation of law and legal discourse in all aspects
of the society is not the core of the global trend towards the judicialization of politics.
Instead, it substantially leads to providing more opportunities to courts to deeply involve
in public policy questions, and political controversies, and consequently judicialize
politics. The current situation in which law, litigation and legal discourse prevails in
modern societies represents a favorable political environment enabling judges to get
embroiled in core social, economic and political dilemmas.

18

Ran Hirschil, The judicialization of politics, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, 2011, at 1.
Torbjorn Vallinder, Supra note 10, at 1.
20
STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN EUROPE 1 (2000).
at 61.
19
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Ran Hirschil introduces a distinct category of the judicialization of politics, which he
terms “the judicialization of mega-politics.” It refers to “the reliance on courts and judges
for dealing with core political controversies that define (and often divide) whole
polities.”21 He indicates that it comprises a few subcategories such as judicialization of
electoral processes; judicial review of executives’ prerogatives in the fields of
macroeconomic planning or national security; core restorative justice controversies;
judicial corroboration of regime transformation; and, most importantly, the judicialization
of formative collective identity, nation-building processes, and struggles over the very
definition of the polity as such.22
Hirschil differentiates between the judicialization of mega-politics on the one side, and
on the other side, the judicialization of “ordinary” public policy making. The latter refers
to the involvement of judges in determining public policy outcomes, mainly through
"ordinary" constitutional rights jurisprudence and the judicial redrawing of boundaries
between state organs.23 It is sometimes also described as “judicialization from below” as
it is often initiated by rights plaintiffs who challenge the public policy decisions or
practices of the executives or legislatures. The judicialization of “ordinary” public policy
making is usually related to expanding the ambit of constitutional rights protection, if
threatened by encroachment of the executives and/or legislatures. Therefore, its common
examples are the cases related to civil liberties and procedural justice in decisionmaking.24
The substantial difference between the two categories of judicialization is political
salience. The judicialization of “ordinary” public policy may appear in cases related to
determination of the right to a speedy trial or to a fair hearing in criminal justice, but they
are not considered as politically prominent as the cases in which courts determine the

21

Ran Hirschil, supra note 18, at 4-5.
Id.
23
Ran Hirschil, supra note 1.
24
Id.
22
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legitimacy of a certain polity or a nation’s collective identity, which manifest the
judicialization of mega politics (sometimes termed judicialization of pure politics). It has
to be put into consideration that the political salience may relatively vary in different
circumstances. What is conceived as a controversial matter of a political significance in a
given regime (like the right to abortion) may be considered a nonissue in another polity.
As a result, the criterion of political salience for distinguishing what is considered a
judicialization of mega-politics is “elusive yet intuitive.”25
Works that attempt to give explanation of the global tendency towards the judicialization
of politics can be divided into four main approaches. The first approach explains the
phenomenon through the lens of rights jurisprudence. According to this rights-centred
perspective, the judicialization of politics stems mainly from the ever-growing awareness
of rights issues and constitutional protection of these rights. Courts are perceived by civil
society groups and political activists as effective and nonpartisan authority for claiming
their rights and freedoms.26 The ascendancy of civil rights and liberties contributes to the
judicialization of politics. Such ascendancy is attributed not only to active judges but to
the existence of “support structure” consisted of the influence of advocacy groups, the
establishment of governmental enforcement agencies, the growth of financial and legal
resources for ordinary citizens, and the strategic planning of grass roots organizations.27
This support structure boosts the access of individuals and interest groups to courts,
which provide them with tremendous privileges. For instance, they are not in need of
forming broad coalitions and seeking for strong political parties to defend and boost their
demands and interests in political field. Courts provide an easier, more rapid and
effective opportunity for them to raise their voice and share in the governance of their
society. Consequently, the growing reliance on courts by individuals and social
movements leads to the involvement of the judiciary in making public policy decisions
and hence judicializing politics.
25

Id. at 728.
C. NEAL TATE AND TORBJORN VALLINDER (eds). 1995. The Global Expansion of Judicial Power. New
York Univ. Press, 1995.
27
Charles Epp, The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists and Supreme Courts in Comparative Perspective,
Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press 1998.
26

9

A second approach, which is a functionalist one, attributes the judicialization of politics
to the increasing complexity of modern societies. States comprises increasingly many
administrative agencies with policy making authorities. For proper government, they
necessitate standardized legal norms and active judiciary as policy makers not just
arbiter.28 On the supranational level, the same tendency towards the judicialization of
politics results, for example in the European Union, from the need for unified legal and
administrative norms across all member states which encounter major coordination
problems.29
A third approach, which is a court-centered one, argues that courts are the main pillar of
the tendency towards judicialization of politics. They expand their scope of judicial
review at the expense of other organs raising controversies about the traditional principles
of separation of power. In some cases, courts and judges are the ones who largely amplify
the ambit their judicial competence and adjudicate on major public policy questions and
then the same courts may opt to impose self-made judicial restraints on their judicial
review.30 These judicial restraints may be grounded on limited capacity of courts to
decide on some pure political controversies and preserving the courts public image.
A forth approach, which is a realist one, contends that the judicialization of politics is,
first and foremost, a political not a juridical phenomenon.31 Courts are political
institutions which work within the same social, political, and economic spheres, like
other political institutions, in a given society. Based on this perception, political support
is a prerequisite for the judicialization of politics, especially that of mega-politics.32 The
phenomenon is largely the outcome of the intentional delegation of policy making
authority to courts by politicians. There are a number of reasons for this delegation by the
28

MARTIN SHAPIRO & ALEC STONE SWEET, On Law, Politics, and Judicialization. New York: Oxford
Univ. Press 2002.
29
Stone-Sweet. Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe, Oxford Univ. Press A. 2000.
30
Jasdeep Randhawa, Understanding The Judicialization of Mega-Politics: The Basic Structure Doctrine
and Minimum Core, 2011.
31
Ran Hirschil, supra note 1 at 753
32
Ran Hirschil, supra note 18 at 17.
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political stakeholders including minimizing risk by transferring political responsibility to
courts, avoiding difficult and thorny decisions. On the other hand, political opposition
may seek for judicializing politics via resorting to courts in order to obstruct government
and challenge its policies. The absence of a political environment that is conducive to the
judicialization of politics, especially that of mega-politics, would result in a legislative
and/or executive backlashes against courts. They comprise legislative overrides of
controversial verdicts, encroachment on judicial appointment procedures to ensure the
appointment of “compliant” judges, in addition to establishment of constraints on the
scope of judicial review.
In my view, courts are the main driving force leading to the judicialization of politics. A
convergence of social, legal and political factors is necessary for the existence and
continuity of judicialized politics. However, all variables are the same, judges are the
cornerstone of the tendency towards the judicialization of politics. The scope of judicial
review is, first and foremost, determined by judges. In both civil-law and common-law
states, judges are entitled the competence of judicial interpretation of constitutional and
statutory rules. The amplification of the ambit of judicial review and engagement of
judges in crucial social, moral and political controversies are basically contingent on the
strategic choice by judges to explicitly or implicitly declare their judicial competence
over the subject-matter of the dispute and adjudicate on the outcome of the
controversies.33
Undoubtedly, the explosive growth of government power at every level, which
necessitates the escalation of judicial review over various agencies and institutions of the
government, as well as the proliferation of rights discourse all over the society contribute
to the judicialization of politics. However, they do not solely account as the main grounds
for the emergence of this phenomenon. On the other hand, the need of political support as
a prerequisite for the judicialization of politics and the intentional delegation of public

33

In chapter 3 of the thesis, I will provide further elaboration and consolidation of the argument that courts
are the main driving force leading to the judicialization of politics.
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policy making authority to judges by politicians do not explain the appearance of
judicialization of politics, let alone that of mega-politics, in authoritarian polities like
Egypt,34 Russia,35 an Thailand,36 where “political support” is unlikely to be provided to
courts by politicians in power.
In Egypt, the judicialization of politics has been constantly and evidently manifested in
the SCC’s decisions. The SCC has managed to expand it powers and decide on the
outcomes of numerous social, economic and political controversies. It is argued that the
SCC was, at first, empowered by the controlling regime mainly for economic
considerations related to the objective of attracting foreign direct investment by providing
credible commitment that property rights would be protected through an independent
process of judicial review.37 However, the Court gained additional leverage with which it
intervened in other policymaking spheres, including civil and political rights and humanrights-related controversies. Analysing the SCC’s decisions indicates that it served as a
“dual-use” institution. On the one hand, it has corroborated the regime’s fundamental
economic objectives and accommodated its political interests.38 On the other hand, it
served as the most significant resort for human rights groups, opposition parties and
political activists to boost civil and human rights safeguards.39 Furthermore, the scope of
involvement in crucial moral and political controversies extended to the collectiveidentity contentions like the core question of the status of Shari’a rules as the primary
source of legislation in addition to various prominent questions related to religion.40 The
34
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apparent tendency towards the judicialization of politics in Egypt is consistent with, and
actually provides an empirical evidence in support of, the proclamation that in the “nonconstitutional” Arab World, written constitutions can provide a ground work for possible
limited constitutional government.41 Although these constitutions are perceived to have a
relatively limited effect in regard to imposing restraints on the exercise of the government
power, they may effectively contribute, with other mechanisms, to the establishment of
some sort of accountable government.
The embroilment of the SCC in fundamental political quandaries through a series of
decisive verdicts was also prominent in the transition period after the revolution of 2011.
The court is criticized for its plain intervention in pure political controversies “in a
manner that would have been unthinkable prior to the Revolution.”42 The SCC
empowered itself and supported judicial despotism over core political questions simply
through stating that it is practicing no more than its judicial competence of the
constitution interpretation. The judicialization of pure politics by the SCC took part in a
series of ever-escalating constitutional crisis that could have been avoided if the Court
embraced constitutional silence, by which constitutional courts in other authoritarian
regimes like Chile and Serbia managed to create apolitical judicial culture to their
respective regimes.43
B- Jurisdiction and Functions of administrative courts in Egypt
Prior to engaging with the cases manifesting the judicialization of mega-politics in
administrative courts, it is of paramount importance to briefly elucidate, first, the State
Council’s judicial competence according to its statute (law no. 47/1972) and the
constitution. Second, I depict roles and functions of administrative courts as influential
institutions interactive with other components of the society.
41
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Egypt is a civil-law state that follows the Latin model of the judiciary structure;
composed of three main judicial bodies: ordinary courts, administrative courts, and at the
top, one constitutional court (the SCC). On the other hand, the Egyptian legal system
embraces a tripartite hierarchy of legal rules. First, the Constitution, which all other rules
have to be in conformity with. Second, legislative (statutory) rules: which are those
enacted by the legislature. Third, bylaws (regulations): which are detailed rules issued by
the executive branch’s ministries, agencies and departments. They have to comply with
the two superior categories of legal rules (constitutional and statutory ones).
Constitutional Review is exclusively entitled to the SCC by virtue of consecutive
Egyptian constitutions. Striking down statutory rules falls exclusively within the scope of
the SCC’s judicial review rather than any other judicial institution. The only ground for
invalidating a legislation is to be declared unconstitutional by the SCC. Accordingly,
administrative courts have no judicial review of any action of the legislature and not
authorized to strike down a legislation.
In 1946, the State Council (administrative judiciary) was established and entitled to
limited jurisdiction over certain administrative disputes.44 In 1972, The State Council’s
jurisdiction was expanded to encompass all administrative disputes.45 It has
comprehensive judicial review over actions and decisions of the executive’s agents and
departments. It was, at first, affiliated to the executive branch, but in 1984, it acquired
institutional independence by virtue of a legislative amendment and was declared an
“independent judicial authority” pursuant to the provisions of the 1971 constitution.46
As for the functions of administrative courts, there used to be a widely accepted
assumption in comparative law literatures that democracy is a prerequisite for the
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emergence of judicial power.47 This is attributed to the hypothesis that courts in
authoritarian polities are perceived to be puppets, and often claws, in the hands of the
controlling regimes that are not likely to possess reasonable independence. Some scholars
advocated this perception claiming that “It is hard to imagine a dictator, regardless of his
or her uniform or ideological stripe, inviting or allowing even nominally independent
judges to increase their participation in the making of major public policies.”48 Recently,
there has been a recognition that even in highly-restricted political regimes, courts
increasingly gain judicial authority. The empirical study in such polities indicate that
courts are not irrelevant to political life. Rather, they perform various roles that are
influential and interactive with other political institutions of an autocratic state.49 In this
regard, courts are perceived to help regimes pursue significant objectives such as
maintaining social control, attracting capital, maintaining bureaucratic discipline,
adopting unpopular policies, and enhancing regime legitimacy.50
In this regard, I argue that Egyptian administrative courts have been entitled relatively
extensive scope of judicial review in order to perform three fundamental roles:
managerial, economic and political. First, they provide significant means to boost
discipline in the immense bureaucratic machinery. Although a restrictive regime is likely
to pay little attention to safeguards of individual rights and basic freedoms, its need of an
efficient functioning of the entire administrative apparatus is apparent. Administrative
courts provide effective channels for reinforcing bureaucratic compliance and monitoring
the executive’s officials. In the 1970s, administrative courts’ competence was expanded
to “restore discipline to a rapidly expanding and increasingly unwieldy bureaucracy.”51
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Second, in 1972, administrative courts were entitled, pursuant to legislative amendment
of their statute, to comprehensive review over the executive branch’s agencies and
departments. Empowerment of administrative courts was in consistency with a more
overall strategic judicial empowerment tendency of the regime. It was deployed as an
economic motivation to entice foreign investors to establish their private investments.
After Nasser era, the Egyptian regime was transformed from a state-monopolized
economy to a liberal one. Accordingly, there was genuine need of direct investments
especially that of a large scale. Administrative judiciary provided, along with the SCC,
authentic legal security for both national and international investors, who were totally
aware of the oppressive process of capital nationalization that took place during Nasser’s
era. Alongside with other constitutional and legal guarantees, administrative courts have
been serving as a substantial check on the executive’s potential encroachment on property
rights.52
Third, consecutive Egyptian regimes have often deployed administrative courts to bolster
their political legitimacy. In Egypt, some scholars contend that law primarily serves as an
efficient and disciplined exercise of state power- a feature described as “rule by law.”53
One of the main characteristics of this feature is to constantly maintain the appearance of
a “liberal” and “democratic” state, in which the judiciary is, in legal terms, capable of
reining in the executive authority via practicing judicial review. Administrative courts
were granted comprehensive review of the executive’s actions to boost and enhance the
image of effective checks and balances to sustain the regimes’ political legitimacy.
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Chapter II. Forms of the judicialization of mega-politics in the Egyptian
State Council:
This Chapter analyses a number of remarkable administrative courts’ judgments that
apparently involve judicialization of mega-politics. Given the fact that these courts issue
thousands of verdicts all over the state, it is important to define certain criteria to
distinguish judgments that manifest judicialized mega-politics. In my view, a given
verdict highlights the judicialization of mega-politics when it possesses one or more of
the following characteristics: 1) narrows the doctrine of sovereignty acts, considered as
one of the cornerstone prerogatives of the executives because it falls outside the realm of
judicial review. 2) encompasses explicit judicial law-making concerning pivotal matters,
as an intervention of the judiciary in the substantial prerogative of the legislatures i.e.
enacting law. 3) involves adoption or abolition of a public policy related to substantial
social, economic, or political questions. All these situations represent the transfer to the
judiciary of the public policy-making authority, previously held by legislatures and
executives.
It should be emphasized that the following three forms of judicialization of mega-politics
should not be subject to binary-model of assessment; either representing constantly
excessive expansion of judicial review or permanently falling within the legitimate scope
of judicial competence. Rather, all forms of judicialization of mega-politics ought to be
assessed on a case-by-case basis according to the facts of the case, the nature of the
actions in question, and the relevant constitutional and statutory framework. Accordingly,
in the following chapter I analyze each verdict separately to indicate the legal grounds
and judicial techniques deployed by administrative judges to expand the conventional
realm of judicial control over the executive’s actions whether relevant to crucial social,
economic or political matters. Besides, I evaluate the judgment in order to indicate
whether the court trespassed borders of judicial control and encroached on the
jurisdiction of the executive and/or the legislature, or the court exercised its competence
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in consistency with the constitution without infringement of another authority’s
jurisdiction.
It should be pointed out that the suggested criteria for determination of forms of the
judicialization of mega-politics are basically related to the legal substance of the
following judgments rather than their actual political implications. These criteria are
contingent upon the constitutional and legal bases of these verdicts engaging in core
social, economic and political matters. Hence, it is outside the scope of this research to
trace social and political outcomes of these judgments. Besides, it is beyond its scope to
evaluate values, social backgrounds, ideological approaches of judges. Research scope is
limited to engaging with the legal grounds, judicial techniques and legal reasoning of
judges in establishing their jurisdiction over various disputes and consequently
judicializing mega-politics.
A- Narrowing the doctrine of sovereignty acts:
The “Acts of Sovereignty” doctrine refers to a set of actions performed by the executive
branch that are exempted from judicial review. The doctrine has been explicitly stated in
all the statutes regulating the State Council. Law no.112/1946 that established the
Egyptian State Council provided for the exclusion of sovereignty acts from
administrative courts’ judicial review.54 The same doctrine is embraced by all
consecutive statutes regarding the State Council including the current law in force no.
47/1972 which regulates the structure, organization and competence of the State
Council.55 However, none of these laws provides a definition of the acts of sovereignty.
A number of approaches attempt to set a criterion for determination of what is meant by
the acts of sovereignty in order to differentiate them from ordinary administrative acts
subject to judicial control. One approach adopts the “political motive” criterion, which
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relies on the motive behind the executives’ actions. The action is considered an act of
sovereignty when the motive that induced executive authority to take it is “political” and
hence falls outside judicial control. Otherwise, it is an administrative action when the
motive behind it is administrative, and consequently it is subject to judicial review. This
approach was first introduced by the French judiciary which chose not to engage in
matters of political nature and implications in order to maintain its authority of judicial
review over other governmental acts.56 This approach was heavily criticized for being
inaccurate in determining the acts of sovereignty, especially as there are plenty of
governmental actions that have both political and administrative motives. Second, this
criterion enables the executive branch to exclude judicial review over administrative
actions by declaring there is a political motive for performing these actions when in fact
there is not.57
A second approach argues for the “nature of act” criterion. Since both administrative and
sovereignty actions are taken by the executive branch, an objective criterion contingent
upon the nature of the act itself is helpful in distinguishing acts of sovereignty.58
According to this criterion, the executive authority performs two main functions,
governmental and administrative. The actions taken by the executive branch as “a
government” authority are considered acts of sovereignty. The “governmental” function
is apparent in all major actions taken by the state as a political unified entity as well as
decisions protecting its supreme national interests.59 On the other hand, When the
executive authority acts as an “administrative” authority, its actions are therefore
administrative and subject to judicial review. The administrative function of the
executives is what relates to the daily application of law and the relations between
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individuals and local and central departments of the executive authority.60 This approach
is criticized for ambiguity. It is incapable of providing a clear and decisive tool of
differentiating between the two main functions of the executive as they are overlapping in
many actions.
A third approach argues for a “judicial list criterion” for determination of sovereignty
acts. As the doctrine of sovereignty acts was basically created by the judiciary, resorting
to judgments would clearly reveal the nature and forms of these acts. Jurists analyze
verdicts related to acts of sovereignty to classify them according to the judges’
perspectives into one inclusive list. According to this approach, acts of sovereignty are
those performed by the executive power and not subject to if judicial power control if the
court so decides.61
Based on reviewing judgments of the State Council, Law scholars classified sovereign
acts into four main groups: 1) acts related to foreign affairs and international relations
with other countries 2) acts related to war actions 3) acts related to safety and internal
security of the state 4) acts related to the relationship between executive and legislative
authorities.62 Jurisprudence provides some examples of the State Council case-law since
its establishment for each of the four categories as following.
1) Acts related to foreign affairs:
Actions of the executives related to foreign affairs are considered acts of sovereignty.
This include all actions pertaining to negotiations with other states, concluding and
signing international treaties and conventions. Also, actions related to international
relations with other states or international organizations falls in the realm of sovereignty
60
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acts. Establishment or cutting diplomatic relations with a state or an international
organization and joining, withdrawal from an international entity are examples of actions
performed by the executive branch as a “government” authority and accordingly are
exempted from judicial review.
The Egyptian State Council declared non-competence over the presidential decree to
conclude the 1979 Peace Treaty with Israel for being an act of sovereignty.63 In addition,
administrative courts declared that they lack jurisdiction over the application for cutting
diplomatic relation with Germany.64 The State Council adopted the same approach and
held that it has no jurisdiction to order the executive branch to close the Israeli embassy
and expel the ambassador65 and the same for Turkish embassy and ambassador and
considered all these actions as sovereignty acts.66
2) Acts related to war actions:
Actions pertaining to war are considered acts of sovereignty that are immune from
judicial control. Declaration of war, decisions related to military operations, and seizure
of ships by force in the time of war are examples of these actions. The Egyptian State
Council ruled that inspection of ships in war time falls in the realm of sovereignty acts as
it is connected to military procedures taken by the state for its security.67 Similarly, it
ruled that it has no jurisdiction over the order by the Minister of Interior to police officers
to fight the British troops which attacked police stations after revoking the 1936 Treaty.68
Following the same approach, the State Council ruled that the decree of acquisition of a
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piece of land, belonging to the Egyptian territory, by the Army Commander is not
considered an act of sovereignty because it is neither related to war actions nor a
defending the territory of the state. As the challenged decree is issued in regard to a
regular administration of the Egyptian armed forces, it is considered an administrative act
that is subject to the review of administrative courts.69
3) Acts related to safety and internal security of the state:
The third group of actions considered as acts of sovereignty are those related to safety
and internal security of the state. Declaration of martial law and declaration of the
“emergency state” are one of the most evident examples of these actions. Nevertheless, as
this group of actions are more directly related to protection of individual rights and
freedoms, courts have attempted to limit the scope of sovereignty acts related to internal
security of the state.
The Egyptian State Council ruled that the presidential decree of declaration of the
“emergency state “is immune form judicial control for being an act of sovereignty as it is
taken by the executive as a government authority for internal security of the state.
However, the decisions and measures taken by the executive to implementation of the
state of emergency are not considered acts of sovereignty and shall be subject to review
of administrative courts to determine its compliance with law.70 These measures include
detention, seizure and confiscation of property, and revoking the license of newspapers.71

69

Al-Mah. kamah al-Id. ārīyah al-‘Ulyā [Supreme Administrative Court], case no. 1942, session of 25 Dec.
1982, year 27 (Egypt).
70
Al-Mah. kamah al-Id. ārīyah al-‘Ulyā [Supreme Administrative Court], case no. 1438, session of 6 Mar.
1983, year 31 (Egypt).
71
Mah-kamah al-Qadda’ al-Idāry [Administrative Judicial Court], case no. 3123, session of 22 Dec. 1981,
year 35 (Egypt)

22

4) Acts related to the relationship between executive and legislative authorities:
Actions of the executives in connection with the legislative authority, especially measures
and decisions prescribed by the constitution and election statutes are considered acts of
sovereignty. They comprise the decisions calling for holding or adjourning parliamentary
elections as well as dissolution of the parliament. Draft laws submitted by the executive
to the legislature in addition to the promulgation of law are also beyond judicial review.
The State Council ruled that the presidential decision calling for holding the
parliamentary elections is an act of sovereignty that falls outside judicial control.72 It also
held that the presidential decision calling for referendum on constitutional amendments is
an act of sovereignty.73
The previously illustrated list of sovereignty acts, classified and categorized by jurists,
has been constantly embraced by administrative courts for decades. The court of
Administrative Justice (CAJ) ruled in many cases that
Sovereignty acts are those actions taken by the government as a
governing authority, not an administrative one. They include
actions of the government in relationship with the two houses of
the Parliament, foreign affairs with other countries, defending
public security from internal disturbance or an external enemy. The
criterion of sovereignty acts is an objective one contingent upon
the nature of the actions themselves not the incidental
circumstances surrounding them.74

In my view, I agree with the judicial list criterion of sovereignty acts. However, two
points have to be put into consideration. First, the Egyptian constitutions prohibit
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exempting any administrative action or decision from judicial control.75 As acts of
sovereignty are exercised by the executive, they have to be perceived as an exception of
the constitutional prohibition to exclude administrative acts from judicial control.
Therefore, the scope of sovereignty acts has to be largely narrowed to comprise only the
pure political actions that are not justiciable according to their nature. They are so
considered if the judiciary has no credible tools to legally assess these acts and decide on
whether they are in conformity with the constitutional and legal rules. For instance,
governmental decisions of international recognition of a new state, cutting diplomatic
relations with another state, or declaration of war are considered non-justiciable actions
because judiciary does not acquire comprehensive and reliable knowledge and tools to
assess their legality or constitutionality. Conventional legal grounds of assessment of
administrative actions like reasonableness, legitimacy, necessity, or proportionality
would be considered invalid and inappropriate if utilized by courts in order to consider
these actions. Second, the judicial list of sovereignty acts develops through time and
varies according to the constitutional framework on one side and the degree of political
freedom on the other side. The more constitutional rights are guaranteed and genuinely
protected, the less acts are perceived to be sovereignty acts.
As previously elaborated, acts of sovereignty are a set of actions performed by the
executive branch that are exempted from judicial review.76 In the past two decades from
2000 to 2020, administrative courts have narrowed the doctrine of sovereignty acts,
especially regarding the two categories of 1) acts related to foreign affairs and 2) acts
related to the relationship between the executive and the legislature. Some prominent
governmental actions that used to be considered as sovereignty acts according to the
conventional judicial list are subject to judicial review and perceived as administrative
actions. The cases in which administrative courts narrow the scope of sovereignty acts
manifest a form of judicialization of mega-politics because sovereignty acts are
75
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considered one of the cornerstone prerogatives of the executives and are very often of
outright political appearance. In these cases, although the governmental actions in
question obviously belonged to Egyptian foreign affairs and international relations with
other countries, and in other instances to the relation with the legislative branch, the State
Council courts deviated from the conventional characterization of these actions as
sovereignty acts and subjected them to judicial review. This represents a noticeable
redrawing by administrative courts of the boundaries between the judiciary and the
executives through expanding the scope of judicial review. As I stated earlier,
judicialization of mega-politics ought to be assessed on a case-by-case basis according to
the facts of the case, the nature of the actions in question, and the relevant constitutional
and statutory framework.
I examine below four cases manifesting the judicialization of mega-politics through
expansion of judicial review to include some acts formerly perceived as sovereignty acts.
The four cases are examined in a chronological order. However, it should be noted that
cases no. 1, 2 and 4 are related to narrowing the doctrine of acts of sovereignty pertaining
to some acts related to foreign affairs. Case no. 3 indicates limiting the doctrine of
sovereignty acts in regard to the relationship between the executive and the legislature.
Case 1. Natural Gas Export to Israel (2008):77
Ibrahim Yousry, a former Egyptian ambassador, filed a lawsuit before the Court of
Administrative Justice (hereinafter referred to as the CAJ) seeking to declare null and
void the Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources Decree No.100/2004 and all the
affiliated international agreements and memorandums of understanding. He claimed that
Egypt and Israel signed a memorandum of understanding, by which Egyptian authorities
promised to export natural gas to Israel at an extremely lower price (that does not exceed
1.25 USD per million British Thermal Units) than its real market value (exceeding 9
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USD per million British Thermal Units). The plaintiff added that according to this
memorandum, the Council of Ministers delegated the Minister of Petroleum and Mineral
Resources to negotiate and conclude natural gas supply contracts with a private company
called “East Mediterranean Gas Company,” which in turn would export natural gas to
Israel.
The CAJ revoked the aforementioned decree of the Minister of Petroleum and Mineral
Resources and all the affiliated acts of the government related to the export of natural gas
to Israel. First, the Court declared that the challenged decrees and actions of exporting
natural gas to Israel by the government are related to the regulation and exploitation of a
significant national resource: natural gas. Accordingly, these actions are not deemed a
matter of international relations, and consequently an act of sovereignty, over which the
court may lack jurisdiction.
The Court then established its decision on two main pillars. On the one hand, the
challenged decrees and actions of the government were not initially submitted to
parliament for ratification. This abstention constitutes a gross infringement of the
constitutional obligation imposed over the executive authority whose actions related to
the natural resources are subject to the parliamentary scrutiny by virtue of article 123 of
the Egyptian Constitution.78 On the other hand, the Court stated that the judiciary had
always possessed the right to review the “objective” of the government’s actions to verify
that they pursued the public interest of the people. The court noticed that executive
authorities did not publish the challenged ministerial decree in the Official Gazette,
although bound to do. In addition, the secrecy and simultaneous unjustified velocity that
wrapped all the measures and procedures of the executive authority contradict
transparency and hence raise doubts about the real objective of the government.
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The aforementioned judgment was challenged before the Supreme Administrative Court
(hereinafter referred to as the SAC) which upheld it in its substance.79 However, it split
the subject matter of the lawsuit into two main constituent parts. On the one hand, it
stated that engagement in international and diplomatic relations with Israel is, in itself, an
act of sovereignty that goes beyond the scope of judicial review. On the other hand, the
quantity, prices and other conditions of natural gas export contracts are subject to the
scrutiny of administrative judiciary. The SAC held that the executive authority is
obligated to set a particular mechanism for periodic revision of the conditions of the
export transaction especially those related to the quantities and prices of the natural gas.
It is also forbidden for the executive to agree with the other contracting party on a
maximum price for export.
The judicialization of mega-politics is apparently manifested in this lawsuit as on the one
hand, the judiciary narrowed the realm of sovereignty acts, declaring that the only matter
that goes beyond judicial review is the executive authority’s approval to export natural
gas to Israel i.e. the decision to have international commercial relations with Israel. On
the other hand, the State Council deeply engaged in setting the general conditions,
requirements and framework of the Egyptian public policy regarding exploiting one of its
scarce natural resources: natural gas. The judiciary substantially contributed in making a
crucial public policy, which reveals the judicialization of mega-politics in this case.
In my perspective, administrative courts have been always creating their own judicial
techniques in order to immensely expand judicial review of the executive’s actions and
decrees. These instruments facilitate the courts’ intrusion in making public policy
decisions and the judicializing of mega-politics. One of these techniques is what we may
term “dispute fragmentation.” While hearing a case that may be claimed to fall outside
the scope of judicial review, the court divides the subject matter of the dispute into two or
more main parts and declare its competence over the most significant part. This technique
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is based on the theory of “detachable decisions,” initially invented by the French State
Council and then adopted by the Egyptian administrative judiciary. The theory addresses
any complex action of the executive that comprises multiplicity of integrated and
intertwined decisions, some of which fall within the ambit of judicial review and the
other decisions do not.
In this case, the State Council split the subject matter of the dispute i.e. the complex
actions of the executive, and declare its judicial review over the separable decisions
subject to its scrutiny. The SAC explicitly adopted this technique in its ruling on the
natural gas export to Israel. It ruled that it has no competence to review the sovereignty
act of the Egyptian government to establish international commercial relations with Israel
but it has jurisdiction to review the details and conditions of the concluded contracts. The
legal reasoning of the SAC is praiseworthy because although this case deals with an
international agreement between Egypt and Israel, the SAC delicately differentiated
between the “international” political aspect of the agreement- the decision to establish
ordinary relations with Israel on one side and, on the other side, the “commercial” nature
of the agreement- its relevance to natural gas as a scarce natural resource. Accordingly,
the Court considered the former aspect as an act of sovereignty and the extended its
scrutiny to the latter. It considered that the constitutional obligation of the executives to
make the best use of the state’s national economic resources is what really counts and
hence, the degree to which the executives fulfil this obligation has to be subject to
judicial control.
This judgment indicates that the technique of dispute fragmentation is a very fruitful tool
of judicial review. First, it enables the judiciary to extend its scope of review to disputes
whose international element is not the core of the subject-matter. Second, amplification
of the ambit of judicial review to such disputes via this technique serves as an effective
mechanism to reveal information about crucial public policies that lack transparency in
all its aspects.
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Case 2. Retaliation for Egyptian victims of 1967 War Crimes (2008):80
A group of political activists including Wahid Fakhry, the Secretary-General of the
“Socialist Arab Egypt Party”, filed a lawsuit asking the court to issue a verdict obligating
Egyptian authorities, especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to ask the Israeli
government to extradite its citizens accused of war crimes, during 1956 and 1967 wars, to
be adjudicated before the Egyptian Criminal Courts. In addition, the court was asked to
obligate Egyptian government to recourse to the UN organs, especially the Security
Council, to issue a resolution convicting the Israeli perpetrators of war crimes during the
aforementioned wars and establishing a special international criminal tribunal for their
adjudication.
The CAJ accepted the case and ruled that Egyptian government may fully accomplish all
the required actions to guarantee retribution, against Israeli military officers, for war
crimes committed against Egyptian civilians and prisoners of wars. The Court assured
that both human rights to life and bodily integrity are embedded in the consecutive
Egyptian constitutions and international agreements. Once these rights are violated, the
state shall provide legal protection for its citizens not only within its municipal judicial
system, but also at the international level. Moreover, the court stated that Israeli troops
committed various forms of war crimes including mass killing of war prisoners,
inhumane acts of torture and murder of Egyptian civilians in Sinai Peninsula. These
actions are considered imprescriptible offences that constitute gross violations of Geneva
Conventions. Accordingly, all branches of the Egyptian government, especially the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, are obliged to take legal and administrative procedures for
determination of the committed war crimes, their perpetrators, and victims. Then, they
have to recourse to the international community in order to exhibit these crimes as
violations of international law and attain global condemnation. The verdict asserted that
Egyptian authorities are legally bound to enable Egyptian victims of war crimes to sue
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Mah-kamah al-Qadda’ al-Idāry [Administrative Judicial Court], case no. 7691, session of 4 Mar. 2008,
year 55 (Egypt).
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the Israeli war criminals before national criminal courts and to pave the way of their
adjudications before international courts. The Court asserted that:
The Egyptian authorities are responsible for citizens’ protection
whether municipally or in case of infringement of their personal
freedoms and bodily integrity rights by an aggressor state.
Abstention from seeking implementation of the Geneva Conventions
and other international agreements to such infringement is
considered illegal. In addition, such abstention hurts the Egyptian
public sentiment that appreciates the prominent role of wartime
prisoners as well as the entire armed forces in performing the sacred
obligation of defending their country. Cooperation among
executives and all relevant institutions to obtain the rights of
wartime prisoners nationally and internationally is legally required.81
The CAJ in this case extensively narrowed the scope of sovereignty acts although the
dispute was genuinely connected to the Egyptian international relations with Israel, the
UN and international tribunals. As previously illustrated, judicial precedents demonstrate
that acts related to foreign affairs with other states and international organizations are
inherited in the judicial list of acts of sovereignty. However, the CAJ adopted a very
restrictive approach of determination of acts of sovereignty related to the State’s foreign
affairs. The Court perceived that the constitutional duty of Egyptian authorities to
guarantee the two human rights to life and bodily integrity of the Egyptian people
imposes a constitutional obligation to take all the required actions to guarantee
retribution, against Israeli military officers, for war crimes committed against Egyptian
civilians and prisoners of 1954 and 1967 wars.
Analyzing the legal grounds of this verdict and that of the coming two cases (cases no.3
and 4) clearly indicates that the constitutional framework is one of the main pillars on
which administrative courts expand their jurisdiction over executive actions that was
traditionally perceived as sovereignty acts. Successive Egyptian constitutions has
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The original reads in Arabic: ﺍﻣﺘﻨﺎﻉ ﺟﻬﺔ ﺍﻹﺩﺍﺭﺓ ﻋﻦ ﺇﻋﻤﺎﻝ ﺃﺣﻜﺎﻡ ﺍﺗﻔﺎﻗﻴﺎﺕ ﺟﻨﻴﻒ ﻭﺍﻻﺗﻔﺎﻗﻴﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺪﻭﻟﻴﺔ ﺑﻤﺎ ﺗﻤﻠﻜﻪ ﻣﻦ ﺳﻠﻄﺎﺕ
 ﺳﻮﺍء ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺪﺍﺧﻞ ﺃﻭ ﺣﺎﻝ ﺣﺪﻭﺙ ﺍﻋﺘﺪﺍء ﻣﻦ ﺩﻭﻟﺔ ﺃﺟﻨﺒﻴﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺣﻘﻮﻗﻬﻢ ﺧﺎﺻﺔ ﺗﻠﻚ ﺍﻟﻤﺘﻌﻠﻘﺔ ﺑﺤﻘﻮﻗﻬﻢ،ﺑﺎﻋﺘﺒﺎﺭﻫﺎ ﺍﻟﻘﻮﺍﻣﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺣﻤﺎﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﻤﻮﺍﻁﻨﻴﻦ
 ﺍﻟﺬﻱ ﻳﻘﺪﺭ ﻫﺆﻻء، ﻓﻀﻼ ﻋﻦ ﻣﺴﺎﺳﻪ ﺍﻟﻤﺒﺎﺷﺮ ﺑﺎﻟﺸﻌﻮﺭ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻡ ﻟﻠﻤﺼﺮﻳﻴﻦ، ﻳﻜﻮﻥ ﻣﺴﻠﻜﻬﺎ ﻭﺍﻟﺤﺎﻝ ﻛﺬﻟﻚ ﻣﺨﺎﻟﻔﺎ ﻟﻠﻤﺸﺮﻭﻋﻴﺔ،ﺍﻟﺸﺨﺼﻴﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﺠﺴﺪﻳﺔ
ﺍﻷﺳﺮﻯ ﻭﻣﻌﻬﻢ ﺍﻟﻘﻮﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﻤﺴﻠﺤﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﻤﺪﻧﻴﻴﻦ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻣﻠﻴﻦ ﺑﻬﺎ ﺩﻭﺭﻫﻢ ﺍﻟﺒﺎﺭﺯ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺪﻓﺎﻉ ﻋﻦ ﺍﻟﻮﻁﻦ ﺍﻟﺬﻱ ﻳﻤﺜﻞ ﺍﻟﺘﺰﺍﻣﺎ ﻣﻘﺪﺳﺎ ﻳﺴﺘﺪﻋﻲ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﺠﻬﺎﺕ
ﺍﻹﺩﺍﺭﻳﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎﺕ ﺫﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﺼﻠﺔ ﺍﻟﺘﻌﺎﻭﻥ ﻻﻗﺘﻀﺎء ﺣﻘﻮﻕ ﺍﻷﺳﺮﻯ ﻭﺫﻭﻳﻬﻢ ﺩﻭﻟﻴﺎ ﻭﺩﺍﺧﻠﻴﺎ
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included robust written provisions on safeguarding basic rights and freedoms in addition
to articles specifically prescribing the jurisdiction and functions of the main state organs.
These two categories of articles have been perceived and employed by administrative
courts as the focal point of extending scope of judicial review. The objective of
strengthening and consolidating the governmental compliance with constitutional
protection of rights enables administrative courts to stand as a vigorous safeguard of
these rights. Based on these constitutional provisions, administrative courts define, on the
one hand, the constitutionally protected ambit for individuals to enjoy and practice their
rights and, on the other hand, the obligations of the executive in order to guarantee these
rights. During this process, the State Council involves in pure crucial political
controversies and hence the judicialization of mega-politics is highly manifested.
In my view, this judgment entails encroachment on the executives’ prerogative of
sovereignty acts. The CAJ excessively interpreted the constitutional obligation of the
executive to protect human rights to life and bodily integrity and turned a blind eye to the
fact that the dispute is genuinely related to foreign affairs although the latter is the core
substance of the dispute not the former. Taking legal actions to guarantee retribution,
against Israeli military officers, for war crimes committed against Egyptian civilians and
prisoners of wars is, first and foremost, contingent upon certain political international
considerations. The executive branch, not the judiciary, is the only authority aware and
capable of weighing these considerations in order to determine which measures ought to
be taken and their proper timing for maximizing effectivity both internationally and
domestically.
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Case 3. Revoking presidential decision calling for holding the parliamentary
elections (2013): 82
As previously illustrated, administrative courts case-law consider the presidential
decision calling for holding the parliamentary elections as an act of sovereignty.83 It falls,
according to the conventional judicial list of sovereignty acts, outside judicial control
because it is related to the relationship between the executive and the legislature.
Nevertheless, in 2013 the CAJ struck down the presidential decree of initiating the
parliamentary elections and inviting the voters to cast their votes. The judgment
implication was so immense that it suspended the entire electoral process all over the
country. In this case, the State Council got embroiled in a significant political controversy
previously perceived to be immune from judicial review, and went as far as to judicialize
acts at the core of the political process.
The CAJ founded its verdict on the fact that the challenged decree lacks a formal
requirement stipulated by the constitution of 2012, in force at the time of the judgment.
The new constitution, after the revolution of 2011, provided that the President must
obtain the approval of the Cabinet before issuance of such decision. The court illustrated
that the 2012 Constitutional framework established a mixed system of government
(presidential and parliamentary) on the contrary of the previous constitution of 1971
which embraced a presidential one. According to the Constitution of 2012, the President
became constitutionally bound, with few exceptions, to possess the approval of the
Cabinet before taking numerous measures as part of his constitutional authority. The
presidential decision calling for holding the parliamentary elections is one of these
actions in which the President shares its authority with the Cabinet.84
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Mah-kamah al-Qadda’ al-Idāry [Court of Administrative Justice], case no. 28560, session of 6 Mar.
2013, year 67 (Egypt).
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See e.g., Al-Mah. kamah al-Id. ārīyah al-‘Ulyā [Supreme Administrative Court], case no. 1939, session
of 12 Dec. 1987, year 30 (Egypt).
84
It is worth mentioning that the implementation process of this judgment started immediately on 7 March
2013, one day after its issuance. The Higher Committee of Elections issued its decision no.20/2013
declaring the suspension of the parliamentary election procedures all over the state84.
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In my perspective, conceiving the outcome of the verdict would falsely lead to think that
the State Council ignores precedents which consider the acts related to the relationship
between the executive and the legislature as sovereignty acts. Nevertheless, this verdict
represents a new approach of administrative courts pertaining to sovereignty acts. This
legal approach claims that the constitutional framework in force is vital in determining
which acts to be considered sovereignty acts. According to this approach, the judiciary
possess jurisdiction over executive actions, although formerly perceived as sovereignty
acts, if the constitution provides for formal or substantive requirements of these actions.
The role of the judiciary is to verify the compliance of the executive to these conditions
whether in the form of procedural stipulation for taking such acts or substantive
requirements pertaining to the subject-matter of the actions.
In my view, this approach is laudable because first, it attempts to narrow the doctrine of
sovereignty acts based on valid constitutional grounds. As a civil-law state, the provisions
of constitution that specifically determines the jurisdiction and functions of the main state
organs, including those on the jurisdiction of the President, must be given imperative
connotation when interpreted. They are not stated in the constitution in vain,
Consequently, when the constitution impose certain constrains on the executive in taking
an action, they must be adhered to. The judiciary is the main organ entitled to assure that
constitutional constraints and limitations are obeyed by the executive. Second, the State
Council approach remarkably boost the rule of law which stipulates that the government
as well as individuals are accountable under the law. The compliance of the executive
branch to constitutional requirements is fundamental to promote accountability of the
government to law. Exempting such actions from judicial review despite the
constitutional framework which stipulates procedural or substantive conditions would
enable the executive branch to evade substantial form of accountability i.e. judicial
control.
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Case 4. The Egyptian Saudi Maritime Border Demarcation Treaty
(2016):85
The State Council verdict on the Egyptian-Saudi maritime border demarcation treaty,
known as the case of “Tiran” and “Sanafir” islands, is perceived as a historic sentence
that represents the extent to which the State Council has been expanding its jurisdiction in
the realm of Egyptian foreign affairs. On April 10th 2016, Each of Ali Ayoub and Khaled
Ali, two lawyers and political activists, separately filed two lawsuits before the CAJ
demanding annulment of the delimitation of maritime boundaries agreement between
Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Both lawyers claimed that this agreement implied a waiver of
the two islands to Saudi Arabia in violation of article 151 of the Egyptian Constitution of
2014 which prohibits ceding any part of state territories. They also claimed that the
challenged agreement infringes all previous conventions that considered the two islands
as part of the Egyptian territory. They emphasized that Egypt has always explicitly
exhibited its sovereignty over the two islands for decades through dispersing military
troops and police officers as well as administering the islands via various decrees and
executive decisions.
After combining the two cases to be settled by one sentence, the CAJ declared null and
void the governmental act of signing the delimitation of maritime boundaries agreement
between Egypt and Saudi Arabia in 2016, which includes ceding of “Tiran” and “Sanafir”
islands to the latter. The Court traced the change in constitutional framework regarding
concluding international agreements in the consecutive constitutions of 1971, 2012 and
2014. Then, it established its ruling on the new constitutional framework provided by the
2014 constitution. It includes explicit prohibition of ceding any part of Egyptian
territories by virtue of article 151 of the Egyptian Constitution of 2014.86 The Court
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Mah-kamah al-Qadda’ al-Idāry [Court of Administrative Justice], case no. 43866, session of 21 Jun.
2016, year 70 (Egypt).
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Article 151 of the Egyptian Constitution of 2014 states that
The President of the Republic shall represent the State in its foreign relations and
conclude treaties and ratify them after the approval of the House of
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affirmed that the constitution defined the scope of the executive branch’s “prohibited
jurisdiction” in the international agreements domain. The constitutional prohibition of
executive authority to cede any part of the territory is absolute and thus cannot be eluded
under any circumstances or justifications. This forbiddance emanates from the territory’s
sanctity, which necessitates legal and judicial protection.
The Court refuted the allegation that the challenged governmental action is an “act of
sovereignty” as it belongs to the international relations domain and thus falls outside the
scope of judicial review. The verdict emphasized that the prerequisite for any
international affairs action to be considered an “act of sovereignty” is compatibility with
the Egyptian constitution. Infringing constitutional provisions entitles the judiciary to
revoke any unconstitutional governmental action or decision. Accordingly, the main basis
on which the court declared its jurisdiction over the dispute, despite being related to an
international agreement with another state, is the constitutional prohibition imposed on
the executives to cede any part of the territory.87
Representatives. Such treaties shall acquire the force of law following their
publication in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
Voters must be called for referendum on the treaties related to making peace and
alliance, and those related to the rights of sovereignty. Such treaties shall only be
ratified after the announcement of their approval in the referendum.
In all cases, no treaty may be concluded which is contrary to the provisions of the Constitution or which
results in ceding any part of state territories.
87
It is important to point out that the Supreme Administrative court upheld the judgment of the Court of
Administrative Justice and refuted the appeal of the Egyptian government in its judgment on the case no.
74236, session of 16 Jan. 2017, year 62 (Egypt). The SAC re-emphasized the same legal grounds of the
CAJ and added additional ones. For further elaboration of the grounds of this verdict, see, Abouelfetouh
ElSammak. To politicize or depoliticize, is that really the question of administrative adjudication?: A study
of the state council judicial interpretation in Egypt. 2019. American University in Cairo, Master's Thesis.
AUC Knowledge Fountain, (He elucidate one of the main grounds of the verdict by stating that:
The court asserted that …. the traditional interpretation of the acts of sovereignty
as a theory should be replaced by a new one, one that reflects a consistent
understanding of the recent constitutional amendments and its effect on the legal
system as a whole. The judgment reasoning asserted on the transcendental value
of the people's revolutions of January 25th and June 30th, that implied new
constitutional reforms leading to a new legal system that changed the
preconception of the Separation of Powers concept, manifested in the great value
restored to the people in exercising their right to participate in the political,
social and economic life in Egypt. Henceforward, the legal interpretation has to
respond to this understanding, which is introduced by the recent constitutional
amendment affecting the foundations of the Egyptian legal system.
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The Court asserted that Egypt has always manifested its sovereignty over the two islands
and effectively implemented its municipal statutes and executive regulations. Moreover,
Egyptian police troops have always existed on the land of the two islands. The two
islands have been part of “Strategic Areas of Military Significance” as declared by virtue
of the Egyptian Minister of Defense Decree No. 367/1986. The court concluded that:
Undoubtedly, the two islands of “Tiran” and “Sanafir” are
Egyptian lands and part of the Egyptian territory, that lies within
the Egyptian State frontiers. Egypt has always practiced constant
sovereignty over the two islands. They have always been subject to
the Egyptian statutes and regulations. The Egyptian sovereignty
over the two islands is completely attained according to the
international judiciary and jurisprudence criteria. Consequently,
ceding these islands is constitutionally forbidden by virtue of the
last paragraph of article 151 of the constitution. As a result, the
governmental act of signing the delimitation of maritime
boundaries agreement between Egypt and Saudi Arabia in April
2016, which includes ceding of the two islands to the latter on the
allegation that they lie in the Saudi territorial waters, constitutes a
gross violation of the Egyptian Constitution and thus shall be
declared null and void. Concealment of the unconstitutional waiver
of the two islands in the form of an international agreement for
maritime boundaries delimitation does not render it legitimate.88

In my opinion, the Court of Administrative Justice adopted the same approach as the
previous sentence on the declaration for holding parliamentary elections (case no.3).
Whenever there are constitutional conditions for practicing certain executive competence,
administrative courts possess jurisdiction to review the adherence to these conditions and
the plea of sovereignty acts would not be acceptable. As previously stated, this approach
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The original reads in Arabic ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﻤﻘﻄﻮﻉ ﺑﻪ ﺃﻥ ﻛﻼ ﻣﻦ ﺟﺰﻳﺮﺓ ﺗﻴﺮﺍﻥ ﻭﺟﺰﻳﺮﺓ ﺻﻨﺎﻓﻴﺮ ﺃﺭﺽ ﻣﺼﺮﻳﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺿﻤﻦ ﺍﻹﻗﻠﻴﻢ ﺍﻟﺒﺮﻱ
 ﻭﺗﺨﻀﻊ ﺍﻟﺠﺰﻳﺮﺗﺎﻥ ﻟﻠﻘﻮﺍﻧﻴﻦ، ﻭﻗﺪ ﻣﺎﺭﺳﺖ ﻣﺼﺮ ﺍﻟﺴﻴﺎﺩﺓ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﺠﺰﻳﺮﺗﻴﻦ ﺑﺼﻔﺔ ﺩﺍﺋﻤﺔ ﻭﻣﺴﺘﻤﺮﺓ، ﻭﺗﻘﻌﺎﻥ ﺿﻤﻦ ﺣﺪﻭﺩ ﺍﻟﺪﻭﻟﺔ ﺍﻟﻤﺼﺮﻳﺔ،ﻟﻤﺼﺮ
 ﻭﺗﺒﻌﺎ ﻟﺬﻟﻚ ﻳﺤﻈﺮ ﺍﻟﺘﺰﺍﻣﺎ ﺑﺤﻜﻢ ﺍﻟﻤﺎﺩﺓ، ﻛﻤﺎ ﺃﻥ ﺳﻴﺎﺩﺓ ﻣﺼﺮ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﻣﺘﺤﻘﻘﺔ ﻁﺒﻘﺎ ﻟﻠﻤﻌﺎﻳﻴﺮ ﺍﻟﻤﺴﺘﻘﺮﺓ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻔﻘﻪ ﻭﺍﻟﻘﻀﺎء ﺍﻟﺪﻭﻟﻴﻴﻦ،ﻭﺍﻟﻠﻮﺍﺋﺢ ﺍﻟﻤﺼﺮﻳﺔ
 ﻭﻣﻦ ﺛﻢ ﻳﻜﻮﻥ ﻣﺎ ﻗﺎﻡ ﺑﻪ ﻣﻤﺜﻞ ﺍﻟﺤﻜﻮﻣﺔ ﺍﻟﻤﺼﺮﻳﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﺘﻮﻗﻴﻊ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﺗﻔﺎﻗﻴﺔ ﺗﺮﺳﻴﻢ ﺍﻟﺤﺪﻭﺩ ﺍﻟﺒﺤﺮﻳﺔ ﺑﻴﻦ،( ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﺪﺳﺘﻮﺭ ﺍﻟﺤﺎﻟﻲ ﺍﻟﺘﻨﺎﺯﻝ ﻋﻨﻬﻤﺎ151)
 ﻭﺍﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﻀﻤﻨﺖ ﺗﻨﺎﺯﻝ ﻣﺼﺮ ﻋﻦ ﺍﻟﺠﺰﻳﺮﺗﻴﻦ ﻟﻠﻤﻠﻜﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﺴﻌﻮﺩﻳﺔ ﺑﺤﺠﺔ ﺃﻧﻬﻤﺎ ﺗﻘﻌﺎﻥ2016 ﻣﺼﺮ ﻭﺍﻟﻤﻤﻠﻜﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﺴﻌﻮﺩﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺃﺑﺮﻳﻞ
 ﻭﺫﻟﻚ ﺑﺎﻟﺮﻏﻢ ﻣﻦ ﻣﺤﺎﻭﻟﺔ ﺳﺘﺮ ﻫﺬﺍ ﺍﻟﺘﻨﺎﺯﻝ ﺍﻟﻤﺤﻈﻮﺭ ﺧﻠﻒ ﺍﺗﻔﺎﻕ،ﺩﺍﺧﻞ ﺍﻟﻤﻴﺎﻩ ﺍﻹﻗﻠﻴﻤﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﺴﻌﻮﺩﻳﺔ ﻗﺪ ﺍﻧﻄﻮﻯ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺨﺎﻟﻔﺔ ﺟﺴﻴﻤﺔ ﻟﻠﺪﺳﺘﻮﺭ ﺗﺒﻄﻠﻪ
.ﻋﻠﻰ ﺗﺮﺳﻴﻢ ﺍﻟﺤﺪﻭﺩ ﺍﻟﺒﺤﺮﻳﺔ

36

is commendable because it maximizes the adherence of the executives to constitutional
requirements and consequently promote accountability of the government to law. It
should be emphasized that the main difference between the two judgments is that in the
case of initiating parliamentary elections (case no.3), the constitutional stipulation for
issuance the presidential decree was a “formal” or a “procedural” one: the approval of the
cabinet. Therefore, the judgement reviewed only the compliance with this condition. On
the other hand, in Tiran and Sanafir case, the constitutional requirement for concluding
any international agreement was a “substantive” one: forbiddance of ceding a part of the
territory. Accordingly, the Court had to scrutinize the subject-matter of the case in order
to decide on whether the constitutional requirement was obeyed by the executive branch
or not. The Court traced the historical evidence of practicing the Egyptian territory over
the two islands especially through police and military forces as well as the previous
international agreements that dealt with the situation of the two islands. As the Court
found that the constitutional prohibition was infringed by the challenged agreement, it
declared it null and void based on this constitutional ground. Therefore, the scrutiny of
the enormous pieces of evidence by the court, with the objective of determining whether
the two islands belonged to the Egyptian territory, falls within its judicial competence.
Checking the commitment of the executives to the constitutional forbiddance to cede any
part of the territory lies intrinsically on the judiciary.89
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It should be emphasized that there were two fundamental responses of the legislative authority to the two
judgements of the State Council on the Egyptian-Saudi maritime border demarcation treaty. First, the
legislature (House of Representative) ratified the treaty including the transfer of the two islands to the
sovereignty of Saudi Arabia on June 14th 2017 and totally overlooked the two judgments of the State
Council. Second, On April 18th.2017, the law no. 13/2017 on the appointment of the heads of judicial
bodies was enacted by the Legislature to grant the Egyptian President discretionary power to select the
Chief Justice of each of the four judicial entities, including the State Council. The president has to choose
one of the three nominees of General Assembly. In the case that no candidates or fewer than three
candidates were nominated, the President possesses the right to select the Chief Justice from among the
seven eldest deputies89. This law completely sets aside the obvious criterion of seniority that was constantly
adopted in the four judicial bodies for decades. It is beyond doubt that this statute constitutes a serious
encroachment on the judiciary independence, including that of the State Council judges.
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B) Explicit Judicial Law-making:
Judicialization of mega-politics is apparent when courts explicitly “make” laws
concerning pivotal social, economic or political matters. Explicit judicial law-making
constitutes an intervention of the judiciary into the substantial prerogative of the
legislatures i.e. enacting law. Conventionally, the State Council’s judicial review is
limited to applying legal rules, whether constitutional or statutory, to disputes. Judicial
review entitles administrative courts to the function of interpreting law. Judicialization of
mega-politics is often manifested when courts are not confined to interpreting and
applying law. Instead, they explicitly “create” laws pertaining to core political, social or
economic matters. It is well-known that while practicing judicial review, judges may
narrowly or extensively interpret specific legal rules. In this case, the question that may
arise is whether courts interpret or make law. This is not what this research focus on. In
fact, judicialization of mega-politics is more likely to occur when the court explicitly
creates rules without engaging into interpretation of existing legislative ones. This is why
this form of judicialization of politics may be termed “explicit” judicial law-making as an
indication of the outright intervention into the fundamental prerogatives of the legislature.
Explicit Judicial law making may occur when there is legal vacuum in regard to a certain
matter. In this case, the State Council plays the role of a legislator and elaborate a
detailed nature, scope and conditions of this matter. In this case, courts do not decide on a
particular dispute, but they create a full elaborated rules to be applied in this case and any
similar cases related to the same subject-matter. In other scenarios, there may be no legal
vacuum. Rather, there are statutory rules applicable to the dispute but administrative
courts explicitly create a specific legal rule and add it to the existing applicable statutory
rules. When the State Council practices explicit judicial law-making in regard to a very
crucial matter like elections, it often entails judicialization of mega-politics as it performs
substantial role in determining who is eligible to run for office and consequently affects
the outcome of the entire electoral process.
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It should be emphasized that proper assessment of explicit judicial law-making by
administrative courts, like other forms of judicialization of mega-politics, necessitates
moving beyond the binary perspective of permanently advocating for or arguing against
the involvement of the judiciary into realm of “legislating” or “establishment of legal
rules.” Rather, it should be assessed on a case-by-case basis according to the facts of the
case, the existence of statutory rules applicable to the facts, and the relevant
constitutional framework. Accordingly, in the following part, I analyze three judgments
that encompass explicit judicial law-making in pivotal matters and manifest
judicialization of mega-politics. I evaluate each judgment in order to indicate whether the
court trespassed borders of judicial control and encroached on the jurisdiction of the
legislature, or its creation of new rules fall within the legitimate scope of judicial
competence.
Case 5. The Civil Servant’s Right to Strike (2016):90
A civil servant working for a Court in Ismailia was tried before the Disciplinary Court in
Ismailia91 because she participated in strike for three days and therefore was subjected to
a disciplinary sanction. The objective of the strike was to raise the employees’ salaries to
be equivalent to their rivals in other departments belonging to the same entity they are
working for i.e. the Ministry of Justice.
The Disciplinary Court in Ismailia revoked the disciplinary sanction establishing its
verdict on the fact that the aforementioned strike did not constitute infringement of laws.
Afterwards, the Administrative Prosecution challenged this judgment asking for
upholding the sanction imposed on the civil servant.
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Al-Mah. kamah al-Id. ārīyah al-‘Ulyā [Supreme Administrative Court], case no. 22314, session of 12
Mar. 2016, year 59 (Egypt). See generally similar verdicts such as Al-Mah. kamah al-Id. ārīyah al-‘Ulyā
[Supreme Administrative Court], case no. 21992, session of 9 Jan. 2016, year 59 (Egypt) and Al-Mah.
kamah al-Id. ārīyah al-‘Ulyā [Supreme Administrative Court], case no. 27047, session of 17 Jun. 2017, year
61 (Egypt)
91
Disciplinary courts are an integral part of the State Council courts. They are competent with the
disciplinary trials of civil servants once they are indicted for committing disciplinary offences. Their
verdicts are challengeable before the Supreme Administrative Court.
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The SAC upheld the verdict of the first instance court. It established its sentence on three
pillars. First, the Egyptian constitution has recognized the right to strike, and considered
it one of the constitutional rights of the Egyptian worker, and mandated the law to
regulate it92. The Constitution obviously states that the right to strike is entitled to all
employees whether those working for the government and its authorities i.e. public
officials or those working in the private sector. In addition, the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), ratified by the Egyptian authority in
1981, provides for the right to strike. The constitution grants international conventions
the same binding force as municipal laws if ratified by Egyptian authorities. Therefore,
the right to strike must be perceived as a legitimate right entitled to all employees as an
aspect of freedom of expression.
Second, the Court stated that the strike recognized by the constitution is the peaceful one
to which the employee resorts in order to express legitimate rights and demands. When
employees are on strike, they have to refrain from affecting their work regularity and
continuity, resorting to violence in any way, and forcing nonparticipant employees to
refrain from work. A non-peaceful strike constitutes violation of laws, for which
participant employee must be held disciplinarily and criminally accountable.
Third, the legislative authority should enact law that regulates the right to practice
peaceful strike, seeking for achieving two parallel objectives: the public interest and the
employees’ legitimate rights. The law should organize certain aspects. On the one hand, it
has to define the obligations of the striking employees via determination of the strike’s
scope. Employees have to recourse to strike to claim legitimate rights and demands
related to their work. It is not permissible to go on strike claiming unlawful demands or
claims not related to the employee’s job. Moreover, legislative statutes may determine the
prerequisites to be followed before going on strike such as submission of requests to
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Article 15 of the Egyptian Constitution of 2014 states that “Peaceful strike is a right regulated by Law.”
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superior executives, without getting response, notifying the managing authority of
conducting a peaceful strike early enough before Initiating it.
On the other hand, the law has to define the administrative authority obligations. These
duties include respecting the employees’ right to strike and not to confront this peaceful
strike with violence. In addition, the administration has to gradually discuss the striking
employees’ demands and negotiate with them, within certain time specified according to
the nature of work. Also, it is bound not to arbitrarily leave striking employees without a
response and not to deny them any of their rights and benefits as a punishment for their
resort to peaceful strikes.
The SAC concluded that as long as the legislative authority does not enact the law
regulating the right to peaceful strike, the court will constantly apply the aforementioned
rules, considered as general principles, attempting to achieve balance between the public
interest and the employee’s rights. It assured that
Until this legislation is issued by the legislative authority, what was
previously mentioned falls within the general rules and principles
imposed by common sense, taking into account the two parties to
the relationship and trying to achieve balance between the public
interest of the state, the right of society and the rights and duties of
the employee. Hence, if the worker abides by these general
conditions and principles when exercising his right to peaceful
strike in order to express his legitimate demands, then he notifies
the competent authorities in the way indicated, did not resort to
violence in order to present these demands, and did not affect the
progress of work and its regularity in the public facility or the
workplace, he would have exercised this right within the
framework of constitutional legitimacy and shall be legally
protected, and thus may not be held accountable for his exercise of
this legitimate right.93
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The original reads in Arabic:  ﻓﺈﻥ ﻣﺎ ﺳﺒﻖ ﺫﻛﺮﻩ ﻳﻨﺪﺭﺝ ﺿﻤﻦ ﺍﻟﻘﻮﺍﻋﺪ،ﻭﻟﺤﻴﻦ ﺻﺪﻭﺭ ﻫﺬﺍ ﺍﻟﺘﺸﺮﻳﻊ ﻋﻦ ﺍﻟﺴﻠﻄﺔ ﺍﻟﺘﺸﺮﻳﻌﻴﺔ
 ﻭﺣﻘﻮﻕ،ﻭﺍﻷﺻﻮﻝ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﺍﻟﺘﻲ ﻳﻔﺮﺿﻬﺎ ﺍﻟﻤﻨﻄﻖ ﺍﻟﺴﻠﻴﻢ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﺋﻢ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺮﺍﻋﺎﺓ ﻁﺮﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻌﻼﻗﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﻤﻮﺍﺯﻧﺔ ﺑﻴﻦ ﺍﻟﻤﺼﻠﺤﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﺪﻭﻟﺔ ﻭﺣﻖ ﺍﻟﻤﺠﺘﻤﻊ
 ﻭﻣﻦ ﺛﻢ ﻓﺈﺫﺍ ﺍﻟﺘﺰﻡ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻣﻞ ﺑﻬﺬﻩ ﺍﻟﻀﻮﺍﺑﻂ ﻭﺍﻷﺻﻮﻝ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻋﻨﺪ ﻣﻤﺎﺭﺳﺘﻪ ﺣﻘﻪ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻹﺿﺮﺍﺏ ﺍﻟﺴﻠﻤﻲ ﻟﻠﺘﻌﺒﻴﺮ ﻋﻦ ﻣﻄﺎﻟﺒﻪ،ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻣﻞ ﻭﻭﺍﺟﺒﺎﺗﻪ
 ﻭﻟﻢ ﻳﺆﺛﺮ ﻓﻲ ﺳﻴﺮ، ﻭﻟﻢ ﻳﻠﺠﺄ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺍﻟﻌﻨﻒ ﻓﻲ ﺳﺒﻴﻞ ﻋﺮﺽ ﻫﺬﻩ ﺍﻟﻤﻄﺎﻟﺐ، ﻓﻘﺎﻡ ﺑﺈﺧﻄﺎﺭ ﺍﻟﺠﻬﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻤﺨﺘﺼﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﻨﺤﻮ ﺍﻟﻤﺸﺎﺭ ﺇﻟﻴﻪ،ﺍﻟﻤﺸﺮﻭﻋﺔ
 ﻭﻣﻦ، ﻭﻳﻜﻮﻥ ﺟﺪﻳﺮﺍ ﺑﺎﻟﺤﻤﺎﻳﺔ، ﻓﺈﻧﻪ ﻳﻜﻮﻥ ﻗﺪ ﻣﺎﺭﺱ ﻫﺬﺍ ﺍﻟﺤﻖ ﻓﻲ ﺇﻁﺎﺭ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻋﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﺪﺳﺘﻮﺭﻳﺔ،ﺍﻟﻌﻤﻞ ﻭﺍﻧﺘﻈﺎﻣﻪ ﺑﺎﻟﻤﺮﻓﻖ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻡ ﺃﻭ ﺑﻤﻜﺎﻥ ﺍﻟﻌﻤﻞ
ﺛﻢ ﻻ ﺗﺠﻮﺯ ﻣﺴﺎءﻟﺘﻪ ﺗﺄﺩﻳﺒﻴﺎ ﻋﻦ ﻣﻤﺎﺭﺳﺘﻪ ﻟﻬﺬﺍ ﺍﻟﺤﻖ ﺍﻟﻤﺸﺮﻭﻉ.
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This case manifests the judicialization of mega-politics in the form of explicit judicial
law-making concerning pivotal matters. The Court obviously illustrated that it creates and
applies its own set of rules that regulate the civil servants right to strike due to abstention
of the legislative authority to enact statutory rules on this constitutional right. The Court
defined the meaning, objective and conditions of the right to strike. It elaborated the
duties and obligations of the two parties to the relationship: the striking civil servants and
the public authorities they are working for.
Verdicts on the civil servant right to strike indicate that administrative courts have been
creating their own judicial techniques in order to immensely expand judicial review of
the executive’s actions and decrees. These instruments facilitate the courts’ intrusion into
the prerogatives of the legislature in crucial controversies and judicialization of megapolitics. One of these tools is filling the legislative vacuum. Conventionally, when
administrative judges encounter a legislative lacuna regarding the subject-matter of the
dispute, their judicial review is restricted to deciding on the actual facts of the case.
However, when the legislative authority refrains from enacting statutes on thorny matters,
like in the field of individual rights that may raise immense political controversies and
contentions, the State Council courts make the best use of the resulting legal vacuum in
order to get deeply involved in making public policy decisions and judicializing megapolitics. Courts provide their own perception of the subject matter of the dispute in a
comprehensive, detailed and probably itemized way, very similar to what the legislative
authority may do. Judges, due to the legal vacuum, are not restricted to concentrate their
decisions on the precise substance of the dispute in question. They tend to express their
exhaustive comprehension of the entire subject matter of the individual right. The rulings
on the civil servant right to strike encompassed extensively detailed conditions and
procedures in a very similar way a complete legislation on regulation of this right would
appear.
This judgment also indicates that administrative judges rely on the tools provided by the
Egyptian constitutional framework to judicialize mega-politics, especially in the realm of
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individual rights and freedoms and the demarcation of boundaries between the judiciary
and the legislature. The constitutional framework provides two main tools for the State
Council to engage in core social or political controversies: the written provisions on
public rights and freedoms and the “implantation” process of international conventions
and multilateral treaties in the municipal legal system. The verdicts on the right to strike
reveal that the court grounded judgments on the constitutional provision that states the
right to strike. Besides, they relied on the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which provides for the right to strike.
The State Council courts rely on international conventions and charters ratified by the
Egyptian authorities, especially those on human rights, to review the adherence of the
executives to public rights and freedoms. Egyptian consecutive constitutions provide that
the provisions of international treaties have the same legal force as national statutory laws
once they are signed by the President and ratified by the legislative authority, and hence
are applicable to national disputes.94 Administrative courts use the provisions of
international conventions as intrinsic tools to address rights disputes and set the
boundaries within which, on the one hand. individuals enjoy and practice their rights and,
on the other hand, the executive may act without infringing these rights.
In my view, when administrative courts encounter legislative lacuna concerning a crucial
matter, especially individual rights, and create their own set of rules that regulate that
matter, they are not considered as trespassing their jurisdiction for two reasons. First,
judicial conduct of explicit law-making in this case is no more than an attempt to redress
the legislative vacuum resulting from abstention of the legislative authority to enact
statutory rules regulating the contentious matter. The intrusion of the judiciary into the
prerogatives of legislature is temporary, in the sense that it is valid and applicable until
the legislative authority practices its main jurisdiction and enact statutory rules regulating
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Article 151 of the Egyptian Constitution of 2014 states that “The President of the Republic shall
represent the State in its foreign relations and conclude treaties and ratify them after the approval of the
House of Representatives. Such treaties shall acquire the force of law following their publication in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.”
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the same matter. Courts do not permanently substitute their own perspectives instead of
that of the legislature. Accordingly, their conduct may not be perceived as encroachment
on the legislature. Second, the objective of the judiciary in creating its own set of rules is
achieving balance between the public interest and the individual rights. The abstention of
courts to create rules for this purpose is likely to result in the violation of the executive of
individual rights as it is often more powerful. The courts involvement is an effective
instrument to rein in the executive power from infringing basic rights and freedoms.
Case 6. Good Repute of Candidates for the Parliament (2015):95
Samir Sabry, a lawyer, filed a lawsuit before the Court of Administrative Justice asking
for rejection of Samia Ahmed Attia (known as Sama El-Masry)’s application for the
House of Representatives elections of 2015. He claimed that the Higher Committee for
Parliamentary Elections accepted her registration application in violation of elections
laws as she does not fulfil the requirement of “good repute.” The plaintiff also alleged
that she is known for dancing and singing in night clubs in addition to insulting her
constituency people.
The CAJ dismissed the case, stating that the defendant is not proved to lack any
conditions of running for office as she has not been convicted by virtue of any final
criminal judgements. News and online reports tarnishing any citizen’s reputation are not
considered definitive evidence of lacking the conditions required to stand for elections.96
The claimant challenged the court sentence before the SAC. He reassured his allegations
that the defendant is not of “a good repute.” He claimed that the court of first instance
overlooked all the submitted documents that prove his claims.
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Al-Mah. kamah al-Id. ārīyah al-‘Ulyā [Supreme Administrative Court], case no. 105519, session of 7
Oct. 2015, year 61 (Egypt).
96
Mah-kamah al-Qadda’ al-Idāry [Court of Administrative Justice], case no. 78410, session of 19 Sep.
2015, year 69 (Egypt).

44

The Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) revoked the first instance court judgment and
rejected the defendant’s registration application for the House of Representatives
elections of 2015. The judgment stated that the right to stand for elections is a
constitutional right that lies in the core of a democratic process. However, the burdens
and responsibilities of any member of the House of Representatives necessitate the
possession of a reasonable degree of trust, credibility and integrity. “Good repute” is
possessing valuable traits and morals that entitle the candidate plausible degree of
credibility in community. The Court found that the defendant in numerous interviews had
lacked good manners and shyness and thus lack the necessitated “good repute”.
Moreover, the Court affirmed that although “good repute” is not stipulated in the
elections statutes as a requirement for running for office, it is considered a general
condition for holding any representative or executive post:
The provisions of both the Political Rights and House of
Representative Acts do not stipulate “good repute” as a condition
of running for office. Nevertheless, it is considered a general
requirement for holding any representative or executive post. Any
representative of the people, in order to be eligible for such
prestigious responsibility of the executive branch supervision, is
required to be of “good repute” beyond any suspicions and also not
to be famous for misbehavior. Accordingly, there is no need for the
stipulation of “good repute” in a legislative provision.97
This verdict represents judicialization of mega-politics by administrative courts in the
field of elections. It involves intrusion of the judiciary into the realm of law-making
jurisdiction of the legislative authority. As previously illustrated, the judiciary intrusion is
apparent in this case because the Court does not interpret a particular legal rule trying to
advocate that its interpretation is valid. Rather, the Court evidently states that it “creates”
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The original reads in Arabic:  ﻭﻗﺎﻧﻮﻥ ﻣﺠﻠﺲ ﺍﻟﻨﻮﺍﺏ ﻟﻢ ﺗﺸﺘﺮﻁ, ﻭﻟﺌﻦ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﻛﻞ ﻣﻦ ﻧﺼﻮﺹ ﻗﺎﻧﻮﻥ ﻣﺒﺎﺷﺮﺓ ﺍﻟﺤﻘﻮﻕ ﺍﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ
ً  ﺇﻻ ﺃﻧﻪ ﻳﻌﺪ ﺷﺮﻁﺎ ﻋﺎﻣﺎ ﻣﺘﻄﻠﺒﺎ ﻓﻰ ﻛﻞ ﻣﻦ ﻳﺘﻘﻠﺪ ﻣﻮﻗﻌﺎ ً ﺗﻨﻔﻴﺬﻳﺎ ً ﺃﻭ ﻧﻴﺎﺑﻴﺎ, ﺍﻟﺴﻴﺮﺓ ﺍﻟﺤﻤﻴﺪﺓ ﻭﻁﻴﺐ ﺍﻟﺨﺼﺎﻝ ﺿﻤﻦ ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻭﻁ ﺍﻟﻼﺯﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﺘﺮﺷﻴﺢ
 ﻭﻣﻦ ﺑﺎﺏ ﺃﻭﻟﻰ ﻣﻦ ﻳﺘﺼﺪﻯ ﻟﻠﻌﻤﻞ ﺍﻟﻨﻴﺎﺑﻰ ﻣﻤﺜﻼً ﻋﻦ ﺍﻟﺸﻌﺐ ﻣﺮﺍﻗﺒﺎ ً ﻷﺩﺍء ﺍﻟﺤﻜﻮﻣﺔ, ﺑﺎﻋﺘﺒﺎﺭﻩ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻭﻁ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﺍﻟﻤﻔﺘﺮﺿﺔ ﻓﻰ ﻛﻞ ﺷﺨﺺ
 ﺇﺫ ﻳﺠﺐ ﺃﻥ ﻳﻜﻮﻥ ﻫﺬﺍ ﺍﻟﺸﺨﺺ – ﺣﺘﻰ ﻳﻜﻮﻥ ﺃﻫﻼً ﻟﺘﻤﺜﻴﻞ ﺍﻷﻣﺔ – ﻣﺤﺎﻁﺎ ً ﺑﺴﻴﺎﺝ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﺴﻤﻌﺔ ﺍﻟﺤﺴﻨﺔ ﻭﺑﻌﻴﺪ ﻋﻦ ﻣﻮﻁﻦ, ﻭﻣﺮﺍﺟﻌﺎ ً ﻟﺘﺼﺮﻓﺎﺗﻬﺎ
 ﺩﻭﻥ ﺣﺎﺟﺔ ﺇﻟﻰ ﻧﺺ ﺻﺮﻳﺢ ﻳﻘﺮﺭ ﺫﻟﻚ ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻁ ﻟﺘﻮﻟﻰ, ﺍﻟﺴﻮء ﻭﺍﻟﺸﺒﻬﺎﺕ ﻭﺃﻻ ﻳﻜﻮﻥ ﻗﺪ ﺍﺷﺘﻬﺮ ﻋﻨﻪ ﻗﺎﻟﺔ ﺍﻟﺴﻮء ﺃﻭ ﺍﻟﺘﺮﺩﻯ ﻓﻰ ﺳﻠﻮﻛﻪ ﻭﺗﺼﺮﻓﺎﺗﻪ
. ﻣﺜﻞ ﻫﺬﺍ ﺍﻟﻤﻮﻗﻊ
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an additional condition for running for office other than those stipulated by the relevant
statutory rules. Given the significance of the dispute as it is related to a crucial political
question and shall have impacts on determination of the outcome of the entire electoral
process, judicialization of pure politics is manifested in this sentence.
In my view, this verdict is criticized for trespassing the boundaries of judicial review by
the SAC and encroachment on the legislature authority. The judgment did not entail valid
legal grounds on which the court established its jurisdiction to “add” a condition of
running for parliamentary elections and explicitly perform the role of the legislator. It
stated that the condition of “good repute” is a general requirement for holding any
representative or executive post without indicating the source from which the Court
derived this condition. Besides, the court ignored the State Council precedents which
require conviction of a crime by virtue of criminal judgements to rule that the person
lacks the required “good repute.” Surprisingly, the Court found that the challenged
applicant does not fulfill the requirement of good repute based on some of her statements
in TV interviews. The Court did not elucidate the validity of the foundations on which it
overlooked administrative case law and adopted a completely different approach
regarding the evidence on lacking a “good repute”
Case 7. Physical and Mental Clearance of Candidates for the Parliament
(2015):98
A lawsuit was filed asking the Court of Administrative Justice (CAJ) to issue a decision
ordering the Higher Committee for Parliamentary Elections to require a medical
certificate proving that the applicant is alcohol-and drug-free and not suffering from
physical or mental illness which adversely affect his performance as a member of the
Parliament. It was claimed that the constitution and statutes have always recognized the
significance of the representative post which presupposes the candidate eligibility to
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Mah-kamah al-Qadda’ al-Idāry [Court of Administrative Justice], case no. 20868, session of 20 Jan.
2015, year 69 (Egypt).
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efficiently perform its tasks. In addition, although both conditions of medical clearance
and being alcohol-and drug-free are not stipulated in the House of Representatives Act as
requirements for applicant registration, they are necessitated for holding any position in
the executive and judicial branches.
The CAJ accepted the case. As for the physical and mental clearance condition, the
judgment adopted a deductive analogy methodology and was established on two main
pillars. On the one hand, the Exercise of Political Rights Act stipulates that voters with
mental or psychological illness who are held in psychiatric centers are temporarily
deprived of their right to vote. This condition of mental and psychological clearance
applies a fortiori to parliamentary applicants whose constitutional duties, after being a
parliament member, are extremely harsher than a voter. Moreover, the House of
Representatives Act requires the disabled applicants to submit a medical certificate
proving that the current disability may not hinder capacity to practice political rights.
Stipulation of physical fitness should be extended to all the applicants not only the
handicapped. The Court assured a general statement that the condition of physical, mental
and psychological fitness is required for holding any position or job:
Based on common sense, whoever applies to occupy a specific
position or job, especially public service, or is selected for that,
must fulfill the condition of physical, mental and psychological
fitness that enables him to perform the duties of this position or job
or do that work, as the case may be, whether the law stipulates for
this condition or is silent on that. This condition is required by
public principles without the need for a legislative provision to
state it.99
On the other hand, as for the alcohol-and drug-free condition, the court assured that
although the condition of “good repute” is not stipulated in elections statutes as a
requirement for running for office, it is considered a general condition for holding any
representative post. Alcohol and drug abuse derogates “good repute” and diminishes the
The original reads in Arabic:  ﺃﻥ ﻣﻦ ﻳﺘﻘﺪﻡ ﺑﻄﻠﺐ ﻟﺘﻘﻠﺪ ﻣﻨﺼﺐ ﺃﻭ ﻭﻅﻴﻔﺔ ﻣﻌﻴﻨﺔ ﺃﻭ، ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﻤﻘﺮﺭ ﻧﺰﻭﻻً ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺎ ﺗﻤﻠﻴﻪ ﻁﺒﺎﺋﻊ ﺍﻷﻣﻮﺭ
 ﻳﺠﺐ ﺃﻥ ﻳﻜﻮﻥ ﻣﺴﺘﻮﻓﻴﺎ ً ﻟﺸﺮﻁ ﺍﻟﻠﻴﺎﻗﺔ ﺍﻟﺒﺪﻧﻴﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﺬﻫﻨﻴﺔ،  ﺃﻭ ﻳﻘﻊ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﺍﻻﺧﺘﻴﺎﺭ ﻟﺬﻟﻚ،  ﻭﺑﺼﻔﺔ ﺧﺎﺻﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﻤﻞ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻡ، ﺍﻻﺿﻄﻼﻉ ﺑﻌﻤﻞ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻷﻋﻤﺎﻝ
 ﺳﻮﺍء ﻧﺺ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮﻥ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺗﻄﻠﺐ ﻫﺬﺍ،  ﺑﺤﺴﺐ ﺍﻷﺣﻮﺍﻝ، ﻭﺍﻟﻨﻔﺴﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﺘﻰ ﺗﻤﻜﻨﻪ ﻣﻦ ﺃﺩﺍء ﻭﺍﺟﺒﺎﺕ ﻫﺬﺍ ﺍﻟﻤﻨﺼﺐ ﺃﻭ ﺍﻟﻮﻅﻴﻔﺔ ﺃﻭ ﺍﻟﻘﻴﺎﻡ ﺑﺬﻟﻚ ﺍﻟﻌﻤﻞ
،  ﺇﺫ ﺃﻥ ﻫﺬﺍ ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻁ ﻳُﻌﺪ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻭﻁ ﺍﻟﺘﻰ ﺗﻮﺟﺒﻬﺎ ﺍﻷﺻﻮﻝ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﺑﻐﻴﺮ ﺣﺎﺟﺔ ﺇﻟﻰ ﻧﺺ ﺧﺎﺹ ﻳﻘﺮﺭﻩ، ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻁ ﺃﻡ ﺳﻜﺖ ﻋﻦ ﻟﺬﻟﻚ
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applicant’s credibility. It also infringes his/her constitutional oath to “respect the Law.”100
Egyptian laws and regulations have always criminalized drug possession, abuse and
trafficking.
In my view, the same aspects of criticism of the previous verdict on “good repute”
condition (case no. 6) may be directed to this judgment. Although the statutory law on
parliamentary elections provides for detailed conditions for running for office, the Court
“created” two additional conditions on its own initiative. The judgment lacks robust legal
grounds for trespassing the boundaries of judicial review by the Court. Given the
importance of the representative post, it is not sufficient for establishing extra
requirements for running for office to state that the condition of physical, mental and
psychological fitness is based on “common sense” or “public principles” as mentioned in
the verdict. The Court obviously replaces itself instead of the legislator and imposes its
own perspectives in a core political matter that tremendously affects the results of the
electoral process as it determines who is eligible to apply to run for office.
It is noteworthy in this regard to indicate one of the self-made judicial technique used by
administrative courts to excessively expand their scope of judicial review, which is
review of the executive’s omission, legally termed as “passive administrative decision.”
Article 10 of the State Council Act provides for its judicial review of the executive’s
omission to take an action required by virtue of law. Such omission is termed in the legal
terminology of administrative courts’ rulings a “passive administrative decision.” This
provision is considered necessary for guaranteeing a comprehensive scrutiny of the
executive in both cases of taking and refraining from taking legally required actions.
Administrative courts have excessively been engaging in making public policies and
creating legal rules on the basis of review of passive administrative decisions even when
there is no explicit legal rule requiring the executive to take a certain action. In other
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and to safeguard the independence of the nation and the integrity and safety of.”
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words, what is problematic is the source of obligation by virtue of which the court
determines whether the executive is obligated to act in a certain way or adopt a certain
public policy. The case is probably simple if the source of the executive’s obligation to
adopt a certain policy is an evident legislative rule. Nevertheless, it becomes intrinsic
when there is no such a provision. When the Court explicitly creates a legal rule, it often
states in its ruling that the executive’s omission to adhere to it constitutes an illegitimate
“passive decision” and hence the court orders it to comply with this rule stipulated by
virtue of “law.” The verdict on physical and mental clearance of candidates for the
Parliament presents a clear example of excessive use by administrative courts of the
review of “passive administrative decision” as the Court ordered the Higher Committee
for Parliamentary Elections to require a medical certificate proving that the applicant is
alcohol-and drug-free and not suffering from physical or mental illness, stating that these
two conditions are necessitated by “law,” although there was no legal rule in this regard.

C) adoption/abolition of a substantial public policy:
A third form of judicialization of mega-politics is apparent when administrative courts
decide on making, suspension or abolition of a public policy related to substantial social,
economic, or political questions. A confluence of factors and institutions take part in the
process of public policy making. It is a very complicated process through which various
political actors influence each other. Conventionally, executive and legislature, as
representative institutions, are entitled to making public policies which have to be
formulated in consistency with the existing constitutional framework and legal
provisions. The administrative apparatus of the state substantially contributes to
implementation of public policies. The role of administrative courts is to review the
actions of the executive during the implementation process of these policies and properly
apply the law pertaining to them. While doing so, they render judgments that provide
suggestions for effective implementation of these policies and achievement of their
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objectives. This is more likely to occur in judgments that highlight the defects and
shortcomings of a particular public policy after it is actually put into force.
At times, the State Council renders judgments that make or substantially contribute to
making a public policy for achieving a specific purpose. Similarly, its judgments suspend
or completely revoke a public policy concerning crucial social. economic or political
matters. In these cases, the locus of political activity is transferred to courtrooms. The
authority of policy making, formerly perceived to be entitled to politicians, is relocated
from executives and legislature to the judiciary. The judicialization of mega-politics is
accordingly manifested when administrative courts make or abolish a pivotal public
policy rather than sticking to their conventional role of making sure that public policies
and relevant legal provisions are properly applied by the agencies and organs of the
administrative apparatus.
It should be pointed out that, in legal terms, when administrative courts decide on
making, suspension or abolition of a public policy, it would be misleading to allege that
they constantly surpass their limits of jurisdiction. Although in these cases, the authority
of public policy-making seems to be transferred to the judiciary, assessment of this form
of judicialization of mega-politics, in regard to excessive expansion of jurisdiction,
should move beyond the binary model of evaluation: either involves encroachment of the
State Council on the jurisdiction of other main organs of the state or lies within
administrative judiciary’s scope of competence. Like the previous two forms of
judicialization of mega-politics, this form should be assessed on a case-by-case basis
according to the facts of the case, the nature and legal characteristics of the public policy
in question, and the relevant constitutional and regulatory framework. I depict below
three cases manifesting the occurrence of judicialization of mega-politics regarding
fundamental social and economic public policies. In each case, I briefly illustrate the
facts and grounds of the judgement. Then, I analyze the verdict to indicate whether it
constitutes an excessive expansion of administrative judiciary’s jurisdiction or it falls
within the scope of judicial review.
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Case 8. Minimum Wage for workers (2010):101
Nagi Rashad, a worker at the South Cairo Milling Company, filed a lawsuit before the
CAJ asking for the establishment of a minimum wage for workers in the private sector.
He claimed that all private sector employees are suffering from very low wages that are
not proportionate to the constant prices increase. The abstention of the government to
determine a minimum wage violates the constitutional rights of employees.
The CAJ accepted the case and established its verdict on two pillars. First, the
constitutional provisions that recognize and protect certain rights cannot be considered
non-binding guidelines. Instead, they are legally obligatory provisions. The Egyptian
constitution has recognized the value of work and considered it simultaneously as a right
and a duty. It has also stipulated for the workers’ rights, inter alia, to ensure a fair
remuneration for their work, guarantee a minimum wage and linking the wage to
productivity.102 Accordingly, these provisions have to been put into force through the
adoption and implementation of actual policies and programs.
Second, the Court affirmed that the government is bound to play an active and
functioning role for a minimum wage determination. Hence, it is not legally permissible
to leave the determination of workers’ wages to the employers who take advantage of the
workers’ need to work and force them to receive unfair wages, that are not commensurate
neither with their work nor the increase in living expenses. The Court indicated that a fair
wage for the worker, regardless of the financial determination of its exact value, has to
guarantee a dignified life for the worker and his family. The Court concluded that the
minimum wage establishment is a preliminary and substantial step to achieve a fair wage
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for workers because they are the weak party in the work relationship and hence their
protection is obligatory.
This judgment manifests the judicialization of mega-politics in the form of obligating the
executives to embrace a certain public policy and take the required procedures for its
actual implementation. It highlights the involvement of administrative judiciary in a
substantial social predicament related to social justice and fair distribution of wealth.
Conventionally, the decision to establish a substantial public policy like fixing a
minimum wage for workers is entitled to the legislature and executives in conformity
with the existing constitutional framework. In this case, the State Council moved beyond
its traditional role of reviewing the implementation of a given public policy by the
administrative machinery and ordered the executives to establish a minimum wage for
workers in the private sector.
In my view, this judgment is criticized because it represents trespassing of the frontiers of
judicial review by administrative courts and excessive utilization of the tool of “passive
administrative decision.” As formerly elaborated, the State Council’s judicial review
includes the executive’s omission to take an action required by virtue of law. When the
executives refrain from taking a specific action although there is a constitutional or
statutory rule that obliges them to do so, administrative courts are entitled to revoke such
omission (which constitutes the passive administrative decision) by issuing a judgment
ordering the executives to perform its obligation. In the case of workers’ minimum wage,
the Court established its judgment mainly on the re-interpretation of the binding force of
the constitutional provisions on the objectives of the national economy plan. Article 23 of
the Egyptian Constitution of 1971, that was in force at the time of the verdict, provides
for the general objectives of the national economy plan which are the growth of the
national income, fair distribution, higher living standards, elimination of unemployment,
the increase of job opportunities, the linking of wages to productivity and the
determination of minimum and maximum wages in a manner which guarantees the
reduction of disparities between incomes. In my perspective, these objectives are nothing
52

but general guidelines for both the legislature and executives to put into consideration
while formulating and implementing the national economy development plan. The Court
misinterpreted the constitutional provision when it conferred these objectives a binding
force, alleging that the objective of establishment of a minimum wage for workers is an
obligatory one which the executive branch is constitutionally bound to fulfil.
Accordingly, the Court “invented” a source of obligation, derived from the constitutional
guidelines, to order the executives to establish a minimum wage for workers. This is
considered an excessive expansion of judicial review because the judgment lacks a valid
constitutional and legal ground to obligate the executive to embrace the major public
policy of workers’ minimum wage.
It should be pointed out that the previous aspect of criticism is similar to what was
directed to the judgment on the physical and mental clearance of candidates for the
Parliament (case no.7) in which the court ordered the Higher Committee for
Parliamentary Elections to require a medical certificate proving that the applicant is
alcohol-and drug-free and not suffering from physical or mental illness, while stating that
these two conditions are necessitated by “law.” Although the conditions of physical,
mental and psychological fitness are not stipulated by the statutory rules on the
parliamentary elections, the court “invented” the legal source of these conditions by
stating that they are stipulated based on “common sense” or “public principles” as I
mentioned earlier.
Case 9. Healthcare Privatization (2008):103
Starting from late 1990s, the Egyptian government initiated a privatization process as a
means to enhance the efficiency of the economy that encountered massive financial and
economic predicaments. This process extended to numerous sectors of the state. As for
the healthcare sector, the Court of Administrative Judiciary (CAJ) annulled the entire
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privatization process of the National Authority of Health Insurance. The Court asserted
that providing health insurance service is a constitutional obligation on the state in order
to preserve and promote the individual rights to life and health. In compliance with the
Constitution, the legislator has entrusted the National Authority for Health Insurance with
two main functions, financing and providing the healthcare service, Accordingly, it is not
permissible for this authority to refrain from carrying out any of these two functions or to
transfer it to any other entity. These two functions are constituent components of its
social duty assigned by the legislator in compliance with the provisions of the
Constitution.
The CAJ also declined the justifications of the privatization process that alleged its
necessity for the healthcare sector development and overcoming revenues insufficiency.
It affirmed that privatization process would undermine the social function of the state to
ensure health and safety of individuals as it grants the entire control over healthcare
service to private sector whose ultimate objective is maximizing profits regardless of any
social or collective considerations.
This judgment highlights the judicialization of mega-politics in the form of total
abolishment of a crucial public policy adopted by the executives. The court got embroiled
in healthcare privatization process as an intrinsic macro-economic public policy. It should
be noted that the Court did not scrutinize the detailed implementation of this public
policy by the administrative apparatus of the state. Instead, it engaged with the legality of
the principal option of the executives to adopt the privatization policy in this prominent
sector. The decision to make or abolish fundamental public policies is no longer
exclusively entitled to the legislature and the executives. This judgment indicates that the
judiciary involves in determining the validity and justifiability of a public policy that has
major consequences on the entire society, and accordingly judicializes mega-politics.
In my view, this judgment did not involve an excessive expansion of the State Council’s
judicial review because it was founded on valid legal grounds that proved the
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infringement of the constitution by the healthcare privatization policy. The Court did not
claim that it provided their own preferred version of public policy in relation to
healthcare system instead of the privatization policy embraced by the executives. Rather,
the court indicated that the privatization policy is not in conformity with the
constitutional and statutory framework relevant to the healthcare system and therefore
may be revoked. Therefore, in this case, administrative judiciary did not trespass limits of
judicial review although it involved into the public policy-making process,
conventionally belonging to the legislature and/or executives. The Court declared the
grounds on which the healthcare privatization policy contradicted with the constitutional
social objective of providing the healthcare to all beneficiaries and violated the basic
rules of the social and healthcare insurance stipulated by the constitution, multiple social
insurance legislations, and international conventions.
Case 10. Omar Effendi Sale Contract (Privatization of Public Sector Companies)
(2011):104
On December 21st 2010, nearly a month before the Egyptian Revolution of 2011, Hamdi
El-Fakharani brought a lawsuit before the CAJ asking for declaring null and void the
administrative contract concluded between the Ministry of Investment (represented as
The Holding Company for Construction and Development) and the “Anwal Trading
Company”105 for the selling of “Omar Efendi Company” at the total price of 590 million
Egyptian Pounds. The plaintiff argued that the determined price is much lower than the
market value of the sold company which exceeds 2.5 billion Egyptian Pounds. Also, the
contract was not supervised by the competent Department of Legal Advice in the State
Council in violation of law. In addition, the purchasing company did not comply with the
contract provisions as it laid off a large number of workers that exceeds the agreed
number in the contract.
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On May 7th 2011, the CAJ accepted the case and nullified the contract as it encompassed
extremely gross violations of laws and regulations related to the privatization of public
assets, that amount to constitute serious squandering of public money. These
infringements entailed selling the shares of Omar Effendi Company at a price that is
completely disproportionate to the rights and privileges obtained by the purchaser. In
addition, the latter had been delivered certain movables free of charge and allowed to sell
assets of historical and cultural characters that are legally prohibited be disposed of. The
Court also declared that the purchasing foreign investor had been enabled to sell the
company's assets at the market value despite being evaluated in the nullified contract on
other bases that resulted in lesser values.106 Besides, the purchaser was enabled to evade
taxes.
The CAJ concluded its verdict with declaring that its findings reveal malicious squander
of public property which unprecedentedly took place under the leadership of many
ministries. The Court described this as “the largest sabotage operations of the Egyptian
economy”, which constitute crimes, if proven after investigations, as well as
administrative corruption that requires accountability. The Court stated that:
The court considers its judicial ruling as a notification to all
investigative bodies in the state: to the Public Prosecution, the
Public Funds Prosecution, the Illicit Gain Administration, and the
Administrative Prosecution, so that each entity carries out its duties
as required by law to protect the country from the evil of
corruption.107
The State Council, in other cases, also nullified a great deal of privatization contracts that
included sale of public sector companies, owned by the state, to foreign investors such as
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the sale contracts of Shebin El-Kom Textile Company, the Tanta Company for Linen
and Derivatives, the Steam Boilers Company and the Nile Cotton Ginning Company.108
Cases of nullifying the sale contracts of major public sector companies, including Omer
Effendi, demonstrate the judicialization of mega-politics in the form of abolishment, or at
least substantial suspension, of a public policy in the domain of macro-economic
planning. Unlike the judgment on the healthcare privatization policy (case no.9), these
verdicts on privatization of public sector companies did not revoke the principal decision
of the executive branch to adopt the public policy of privatization. In almost all these
cases, the court affirmed that the privatization of public sector companies, in itself, aims
that improving economic efficiency by relying on market mechanisms and competition,
alleviating financial burdens on countries that suffer from large losses in public sector
companies, and expanding the size of the private sector.109However, the court reviewed
all the elements, decisions, conditions and implementation details of the companies’ sale
contracts and, in all cases, eventually declared these contracts null and void for violation
of law. It is undeniable that every judgment in this regard may not be manifest, in itself,
judicialization of mega-politics. Nevertheless, the fact that all the sale contracts of public
sector companies were nullified by the State Council signifies the total suspension of this
major public policy by administrative judiciary, which reflects a form of judicialization
of mega-politics.
It should be emphasized that the scrutiny of the sale contracts of public sector companies
falls within the scope of the State Council’s Judicial review. Article 10 of law no.47/1972
on the State Council provides for the competence of administrative courts to review all
administrative contracts. Sale contracts of public sector companies, owned by the State,
to private investors, are considered administrative contracts which the State Council
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possess jurisdiction to review. Accordingly, these judgments do not entail excessive
expansion of jurisdiction of administrative courts. They represented a legitimate practice
of judicial review by the State Council, but they eventually led to a total suspension of
the privatization process as the court revealed numerous gross violations of laws and
regulations that amounted to massive corruption by the executive authority while
concluding and enforcing the sale contracts and consequently nullified them all.
A judicial technique which facilitate judicialization of mega-politics, in its three forms, is
the expansion of standing requirement before administrative courts i.e. the concept of
“litigant’s interest.” For the lawsuit to be admitted by administrative courts, it is legally
stipulated that the plaintiff possesses an “interest” in the litigation. This “interest”
condition is fulfilled when the plaintiff’s factual or legal status is directly affected by the
challenged action or decision of the executive. Administrative courts have widened the
definition of the litigant’s interest as a condition of the case admissibility. The expansion
of the definition of the “litigant’s interest” is a general rule permanently assured by
administrative judiciary in various types of cases. Whenever the challenged action or
decree of the government is related to the whole Egyptian society, courts declare that it is
sufficient for the plaintiff to be an “Egyptian citizen” to admit the case. Being a citizen
implies that the plaintiff is directly affected by the challenged decision and therefore the
case is admitted. This expansion of the “interest” definition has yielded a tremendous
increase in the accessibility of individuals to administrative courts. As a result, the
frequency of lawsuits pertaining to challenging major public policies embraced by the
executive has been largely growing. All the verdicts on privatization of healthcare and
public sector companies provide evident examples of the ever-increasing expansion of
the litigant’s “interest”. The State Council declared the admissibility of these case on the
basis that all plaintiffs are Egyptian citizens and therefore they would be affected by the
negative results of such major social and economic public policies that affect the entire
society. In my view, this approach is laudable because it expands the scope of judicial
review over the executives in pivotal matters that have impacts on the whole society to
ensure their adherence to constitutional and statutory rules. This would promote
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accountability of the government to law. Narrowing the definition of “litigant’s interest”
in such cases would enable the executive branch to elude a fundamental form of
accountability i.e. judicial control.
It is worth mentioning that after administrative courts invalidated plentiful sales of assets
and companies owned by the state, like in Omar Effendi Case, the legislative authority
enacted law no. 32/2014 which prohibits any party other than the contracting parties from
challenging sales or investment contracts signed by the Egyptian state with any entity.
Moreover, the law provides immunity for the judicially-challenged contracts at the time
of its promulgation as it compels courts to declare all the ongoing relative lawsuits
“inadmissible.” Therefore, the State Council competence over the state contracts has been
largely diminished110.
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Chapter III. Factors contributing to the judicialization of politics in the Egyptian
administrative judiciary:
The tendency of the State Council courts towards the judicialization of mega-politics is a
sociopolitical and legal phenomenon which can be attributed to the convergence of an
array of factors. These factors can be divided into three main categories: institutional
elements, legal mobilization and judicial role perception. This chapter endeavors to
elucidate these factors and explain which one may be considered as the main driving
force behind the judicialization of mega-politics.
A. Institutional elements:
The emergence of the trend towards the judicialization of politics in Egyptian
administrative courts is backed by the presence of three basic institutional factors. First,
the existence of a constitutional framework that facilitates judicial activism is a critical
factor of judicialization of mega-politics. As Hirschil contends:
The existence of a constitutional catalogue of rights and judicial
review mechanisms not only provides the necessary institutional
framework for courts to become more vigilant in their efforts to
protect the fundamental rights and liberties of a given polity’s
residents; it also enables them to expand their jurisdiction to
address vital moral dilemmas and political controversies of crucial
significance to that polity.111
Administrative judges fundamentally rely on the constitutional framework to decide on
crucial social, economic, and political controversies. The constitutional framework
provides two main tools for the State Council to make crucial public policy decisions: the
written provisions on rights and freedoms as well as the texts that determine the
jurisdiction and authoritative powers of the executives.
Since 1971, Consecutive Egyptian constitutions have provided for detailed provisions on
individual rights and liberties. In addition, they grant international conventions and
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multilateral treaties the binding force of municipal laws once ratified by Egyptian
authorities. Hence, the provisions of all ratified human rights conventions and treaties are
constituent part of the legal rules applied before courts. While adjudicating disputes,
administrative courts consider specific rights texts, of the constitution or a human rights
convention, as the focal point of the verdict, and simultaneously prescribe the definition,
scope, limitations and parameters of the intended right or liberty, which eventually
manifest judicialization of politics in this regard.112
Administrative judges have apparent propensity to go beyond the text of applicable law,
if there is any, and rely more on their personal ideological preferences, cultural tilts, and
social backgrounds. This is described as judicial activism.113 Judges may not interpret the
provisions of legal rules in a mechanistic way. Rather, they address more considerations
other than the written words of the applicable law such as the real intent of the creator of
these rules, whether constitutional or international, with the objective of attaining their
compatibility with the relevant social, political and economic environments. When the
text of the constitution or a human rights convention is ambiguous, or not well-defined,
judges provide their own set of rules governing the dispute, based on their own
perception of what the “proper” interpretation of the text is, or what the law ought to be.
Consequently, judicial activism of administrative judiciary, through interaction with the
auspicious constitutional framework, is more likely to pave the way towards the
judicialization of mega-politics.
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The previously elaborated judgment on the civil servant right to strike (case no.5) is an
apparent example when the court established its judgments on the provisions of the
constitution and of the ICESCR114 that provide for the right to strike and explicitly
provided their own set of rules governing the issue. Moreover, the verdict that established
the minimum wage of workers (case no. 8) clearly indicates how courts deviate from
non-binding interpretation of some constitutional texts; and rather rely on their ideologies
and policy preferences to present a novel and more authoritative interpretation of
constitutional provisions to accord them a binding force.
Another prominent indication of the constitutional framework as a crucial element of
judicialization is a number of judgements that prohibited police officers, affiliated to the
Ministry of Interior, from entering the universities campuses and practicing any activities
affecting the university independence. Although there were no legal rules regulating the
police officers’ existence and role in universities, verdicts of administrative courts banned
such existence, on the basis that it constituted infringement of the constitutional right to
education.115
Another tool provided by the constitutional framework is constitutional texts that
enumerate authoritative powers of the executives. As illustrated in Chapter 2,
administrative judiciary declares jurisdiction over executive actions, although formerly
perceived as sovereignty acts, when the constitutional framework changes and the new
constitution provides for formal or substantive requirements of these actions. The role of
the judiciary is to verify the compliance of the executive to these conditions whether in
the form of procedural stipulation for taking such acts (as in the case of nullifying the
presidential decree calling for holding the parliamentary elections due to lack of the
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Cabinet approval as a procedural condition) or substantive requirements pertaining to the
subject-matter of the actions (as in the case of the Egyptian Saudi maritime border
demarcation treaty, in which the court reviewed the adherence of the executive to the
constitutional forbiddance to cede any part of the territory)
Second, the development of a modern complex state with large bureaucratic machinery is
a considerable factor of the judicialization of mega-politics.116 Expansion of judicial
review of administrative courts is an inevitable outcome of the sophistication and
complexity of the Egyptian society through time. The State Council scrutinizes the
actions of enormous amount of public authorities and agents of the executive branch
responsible for making and enforcing a myriad of policies pertaining to education,
healthcare, transportation, environmental protection, investment and the like. This
immense administrative apparatus with wide spectrum of fields raises the opportunities of
administrative courts to deeply engage in these domains. As I previously elucidated, the
involvement of the State Council in public policies arenas goes beyond guaranteeing
proper implementation and achievement of their objectives and extends to establishment
or abolishment of public policies. The more immense and diverse bureaucratic machinery
is, the more possible occasions for the State Council to judicialize mega-politics through
substantially making, suspending or revoking a major public policy.
Third, the accessibility of the State Council courts, compared to the Supreme
Constitutional Court (SCC), is an important aspect that has implications for
judicialization of politics. Egypt employs a centralized model of constitutional review
characterized by one single court i.e. the SCC, entrusted with deciding constitutionality
of legal rules. The SCC is not directly accessible through the ordinary litigation
procedures before ordinary and administrative courts. According to Law no. 48/1979
governing the operations of the SCC, a lawsuit may be filed before the SCC only when a
court, during litigation, decides the referral of a case to the SCC to declare the
constitutionality of particular legal provisions related to the dispute, either on its own
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initiative or upon the request of a party to the litigation.117 Accordingly, direct resort of
litigants to the SCC claiming the unconstitutionality of a legal provision is inadmissible
by virtue of law. On the contrary, administrative courts are directly accessible by litigants
through ordinary procedures. The institutional element of courts accessibility is a
contributory factor to the constant increase in administrative cases, especially those
related to the infringement of the individual rights by the executive. This facilitates the
embroilment of judges in core political and social predicaments and the occurrence of
judicialization of mega-politics.

B. Legal Mobilization:
Legal mobilization of effective social and political actors seeking for social change via
strategic litigation before the State Council is considered a substantial factor leading to
the judicialization of mega-politics. NGOs, political activists and interest groups resort to
litigation to invoke the protection of individual right and freedoms. This process, called
“Legal mobilization from below,” has rapidly increased because administrative courts,
side by side with the SCC, are perceived to be active courts, that constitute a fair,
impartial and more respected forum to pursue major change in the economic, political or
social environments.118 In an undemocratic regime, as there is little possibility and
capability of the people to attain a given societal change or invoke rights via
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representative authorities, judicial avenues are considered rapid and effective means to
pursue such objectives.119 In Egypt, some scholars contend that law primarily serves as
an efficient and disciplined exercise of state power- a feature described as “rule by
law,”120 It is characterized by using law as a tool of social control while allowing
marginalized groups to seek redress. It is argued that legal mobilization so widespread in
Egypt is an outcome of the activists’ attempts to achieve a transformation of rule by law
to the rule of law. Due to the state’s reliance on rule by law, it is expected that law would
become the main expression of societal contention, given the fact that it is embedded in
state’s fabric and practices.121
In consolidated democracies, the rights discourse has been deployed. Raising rights
awareness relies not only on the existence of written rights bills and charters, but also on
the existence of support structure for legal mobilization. This structure is composed of
four main integrated grounds: rights-advocacy organizations, pro-rights lawyers, financial
aid, and governmental rights-enforcement agencies.122 On the contrary, in restrictive
polities, there are numerous obstacles that hinder this support structure from effective
functioning such as restrictive legislation targeting civil society organizations and fastchanging statutes regulating pivotal matters.123 As a result, few civil society organizations
and political activists can be efficiently active and capable of mobilizing litigation.
Despite encountering tangible obstacles to legal mobilization, NGOs and political
activists in Egypt performed a noticeable role in providing the demand-side of the
judicialization of mega-politics though initiating plenty of lawsuits in various contentious
fields in the State Council courtrooms. For instance, the case of the workers’ minimum
wage establishment (case no.8) was filed by a human rights organization called the
Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights (ECESR) on behalf of a worker in a
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public sector company. Privatization cases of Omar Effendi and other public sector
companies (case no. 10) were all filed by activists. The lawsuit of natural gas export to
Israel (case no. 1) was filed by a former ambassador. The case of public health
privatization (case no. 9) was initiated by a human rights organization called the Egyptian
Initiative for personal rights (EIPR).124
In all these cases, administrative courts assured that if the plaintiff challenges a national
public policy or a governmental action that affects the whole society, it is sufficient for
the case to be admissible that he/she is an “Egyptian citizen” without any further
requirement of the standing right (locus standi).125 This emphasizes the expansion of the
definition of the “litigant’s interest” as a condition of the case admissibility by
administrative courts. As elaborated in Chapter 2, this is a judicial technique utilized by
the State Council for expansion of judicial review. NGOs, political activists, and civil
society organizations largely make the best use of this advantage, furnished by
administrative courts, when they opt to resort to judicial avenues to challenge a
governmental action or a public policy.
C. Judicial Role Perception:
In consolidated democracies, expansion of judicial review is sometimes assessed as
opponent to democratic governing principles. Therefore, widening the realm of judicial
review is often criticized for the counter-majoritarian impact of resorting to courts that
seize power from democratically elected representatives in violation of the constitutional
separation of powers.126 In restrictive regimes, the counter-majoritarian accusation of
courts would be meaningless because they lack majoritarian democracy.
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In my view, the previously stated institutional elements as well as legal mobilization are
not sufficient to explain the trend of judicialization of politics in Egypt. In restrictive
polities, when courts are not situated in their “ideal” context i.e. a liberal constitutional
democracy, the position and role of courts are more apparent than other elements that
determine judicial decision-making.127 Accordingly, examination of the judicial
ideational propensity of administrative judges to critically involve in policy-making
process is a fundamental approach for analyzing and explaining judicialized megapolitics.
Scholarly work on comparative judicial politics have illuminated the prominence of
ideational factors that affects courts’ engagement in public policy decisions and scrutiny
of unruly actions of elected representatives. In the US context, the attitudinal model128 of
judicial decision-making contends that attitudes, values, ideologies and policy
preferences substantially formulate judicial decisions.129 Outside the US context, some
scholars extend the ideational approach to judicial politics, based on the argument that
judicial attitudes are more complicated and hence go beyond simple party identification
and left-right political ideology as prescribed in the American attitudinal model. Hilbink
emphasizes that there are other critical determinants of how judges address particular
issues, especially those related to judicial review of executives and legislature, such as
“judicial role perception.”130 She argues that examination of cases that involve politically
powerful actors in which judges seek to nullify, limit or alter the actions of these actors
indicates that judicial role perceptions are crucial in shaping judges’ interest in engaging
127
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in such cases. She advocates that judges become willing to, and capable of, engaging in
cases challenging other political powerful actors due to their professional selfunderstanding of their role as guarantor of fundamental legal principles. Such sincere
judicial attitudes “are not inert background characteristics, awaiting the right strategic
conditions to be released or activated; rather, they are themselves crucial to explaining
proclivity to assert their authority against powerful actors.”131
In line with this view, some scholars argue that in many African states, judges were the
cornerstone of establishing institutions and legal cultures able to boost constitutional
conceptions of judicial independence and review.132 Individual leadership of some judges
played a crucial role in institutional development of the judiciary. Those judges were
committed to the values of constitutional democracy including curbing the executive
authority, bolstering individual rights, and building a strong judiciary. Other scholars
adopt the same approach, asserting that whether or not judges expand their authority and
get embroiled in policy making decisions especially regarding individual rights, is mainly
contingent upon their specific attitudes towards rights.133 Acknowledging that there are
other factors facilitating judicial involvement in rights issues, the initial push for this
judicialization of politics in this field would originate with a group of judges who share
the view that constitutions and bills of rights entail responsibilities for the government
and judges ought to utilize their power to guarantee its compliance with these
constitutional duties. If judges are not internally predisposed to enforce constitutional
provision on individual rights, it is unlikely that other factors would result in
judicialization of politics in rights issues.
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This research argues that professional role perception of administrative judges, through
interactions with constitutional texts and legal inputs, is the major factor of judicialization
of mega-politics This judicial perception of their role as guarantor of rights and liberties
and a fundamental constitutional check on the executive authority is the result of
accumulated progressive judicial practice for the past decades- what I describe as
“progressive judicial legacy.” In other words, ideational characteristics of administrative
judges concerning their professional role have been institutionally and historically
formulated. The State Council judges hold the belief that they should be actively involved
in protection of individual rights and freedoms and guaranteeing the adherence of the
executives to the rule of law; and they shape their judgments accordingly. Therefore, they
express outright propensity, via their rulings, to engage in public policy-making in
various social, economic, moral and political issues.
In my opinion, the collective judicial role perception is the outcome of the judicial
progressive legacy formed via countless State Council rulings all over its history that
have meant to impose limitations on the executive’s hegemony over the society.
Administrative judiciary has a legacy of judgments, from the very beginning of the State
Council history, that imposes genuine restrictions on the executive, ensures that it works
within the constitutional and legal framework, and provides guarantees of public rights.
Since its establishment in 1946, the State Council has exercised review of the executives’
actions and decisions and issued numerous decisions demonstrating its active position of
protecting individual rights. Many of these cases were considered of political significance
as they were relevant to the political hegemony of powerful politicians over opposition.
For example, although Egypt underwent martial law for a very long period, the State
Council has constantly ruled that the decisions and measures taken by the executive to
implementation of martial law are not considered acts of sovereignty and shall be subject
to review of administrative courts to determine its compliance with law. In 1948, the
Court of Administrative Justice (CAJ) ordered the Minister of Defense to pay, from his
69

own patrimony, two thousand Egyptian pounds as a compensation to a military officer for
not implementing a judicial verdict in his favor.134 In 1951, the State Council revoked the
governmental forbiddance of opposition newspapers distribution135 and in 1952 it
reviewed deportation decisions as administrative ones not sovereign acts.136
During Nasser era, some

statutes were enacted to exempt specific governmental

decisions from judicial review.137 However, the CAJ was so bold that it declared these
provisions are unconstitutional138 and therefore the court would not apply them,139
although there was no constitutional provision forbidding exempting administrative
decision from judicial review.140 Furthermore, upon Sadat conclusion of the 1979 Peace
Treaty with Israel and in response to paramount opposition to this treaty, Sadat took
numerous repressive decisions against opposition including transfer of some journalists,
transfer of some faculty professors, seizure of some organizations’ funds and revoking
authorization of some newspapers. The State Council declared its competence over all
these decisions on the basis that they are all administrative decisions despite the apparent
political motive behind them.141
The previous cases are few, albeit indicative, examples of the progressive judicial legacy
of the State Council. Since establishment, administrative courts have asserted their legal
authority vis-à-vis politicians in power, positioning the State Council as the shield of
rights and freedoms. Judges have expressed their willingness and capability of standing
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against the political regime, within the ambits of constitutional and legal provisions, on
behalf of protection of rights and boosting the rule of law. As Hilbink contends, judicial
attitudes are “not necessarily private/individual and exogenous but are often socially
and/or institutionally constituted.”142 In my view, administrative judges’ selfunderstanding of their role as guarantor of rights and freedoms against executives is
basically shaped and formulated by institutional legacy of progressive judicial activism,
manifested a myriad of rulings that limit the power of executives and guarantee
fundamental rights.
Members of the State Council are undoubtedly diverse in their individual ideologies,
political orientations, and social backgrounds; however, they are committed to a unified
normative perception of their mission or duty as guarantor of rights and liberties and a
fundamental constitutional check on the executive authority. These normative ideas of
their role is constantly expressed in the State Council precedents. In numerous cases,143
the State Council ruled that
The State Council courts are entrusted with administration of
justice, protection of the principle of legality, the rule of law, and
public and private rights and liberties of Egyptians within the
framework of constitutional and statutory principles that govern the
state and society and determine the objectives of the public
interest.144
This professional perception of the State Council role is in consistency with what jurists
describe as the substantial social function of administrative judiciary- guarantee of the
executives’ respect for individual rights and liberties stated by law145. The State Council
is a major check on the executive authority’s actions and decisions to ensure its
142
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adherence to the principles of the rule of law. It is considered a fundamental pillar of a
civilized democratic state that guarantees basic rights. The evaluation of the
administrative judiciary’s functioning and effectivity should be based on the extent to
which it performs its social oversight role of the executives’ respect for individual rights
and freedoms within the constitutional and regulatory framework.146
The progressive judicial legacy lies in the core of administrative judges’ beliefs and
embolden them to declare null and void any action or resolution of the executive however
significant and whoever its issuer may be. Administrative judges bear in their collective
mind that the judicial entity to which they belong i.e. the State Council, was mainly
founded to provide checks on the executive. This inherited boldness increases the
probability of administrative judges to massively involve in the policy-making process
either by declaring the illegitimacy of a governmental public policy in force, or by
ordering the executive to adopt a certain one, emanating from their interpretation of the
constitution and ordinary statutes.
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Conclusion.
Over the past decades, judicial power has expanded all over the world.147 Courts all over
the world make significant policy decisions that were previously perceived as the
purview of politicians. Judges gradually expand their authority and constantly issue
rulings pertaining to the most pivotal social, economic and political predicaments in
many countries. The process of policy-making has been deeply integrated with the core
function of judges to interpret and apply the law. This led to the emergence of what may
be termed the “judicialization of politics”. The judicialization of politics has expanded its
ambit to comprise what is termed “mega-politics”- matters of ultimate political
significance in a society.
Analysis of administrative courts’ judgments clearly indicates the occurrence of the
judicialization of mega-politics. There are three forms of such judicialization. First, it
appears when the judiciary narrowly defines the doctrine of sovereignty acts as one of the
cornerstone prerogatives of the executives. Second, it is apparent when administrative
courts perform explicit judicial law-making concerning pivotal matters, as an
involvement of the judiciary into the substantial prerogative of the legislatures. Third, the
phenomenon is observed when the judiciary get embroiled in adoption or abolition of a
public policy related to substantial social, economic, or political questions.
The tendency of the State Council towards the judicialization of mega-politics may be
attributed to the convergence of an array of factors including institutional elements, legal
mobilization and judicial attitudes. First, there are three basic institutional factors that
contribute to the judicialization of mega-politics. They are the existence of a
constitutional framework that facilitates judicial activism, the development of a modern
complex state with large bureaucratic machinery and the accessibility of the State
Council courts, compared to the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC). Second, legal
mobilization by effective social and political actors seeking for social change via strategic
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litigation before the State Council is considered a substantial factor leading to the
judicialization of mega-politics. Third, professional role perception of administrative
judges, through interactions with constitutional texts and legal inputs, is the major factor
and the main driving force behind the judicialization of mega-politics The judicial
perception of their role as guarantor of rights and liberties and a fundamental
constitutional check on the executive authority is the result of accumulated progressive
judicial practice for the past decades- what I describe as “progressive judicial legacy.”
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